

Production Networks and Firm-level Elasticities of Substitution*

Brian C. Fujiy[†]

Devaki Ghose[‡]

Gaurav Khanna[§]

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Abstract

We provide one of the first causal estimates of elasticities of substitution across suppliers within the same product. We identify these elasticities using new real-time administrative tax data on firm-to-firm transactions, with product-level prices and quantities. We leverage geographic and temporal variation from India's Covid-19 lockdowns to derive causal estimates of these elasticities. Suppliers are highly complementary even at this granular level, with an estimated elasticity of 0.55. We empirically explore explanations behind this low elasticity, showing that the quality of institutions, input specificity, inventories, and time horizons matter. These firm-level complementarities amplify the propagation of negative shocks through production networks, and make connected firms important for shock propagation. In policy counterfactuals, we show that given these complementarities, allowing more connected firms to operate in the face of shocks mitigates output declines non-linearly with the size of the productivity shock.

Keywords: production networks, elasticities of substitution, shock propagation, resilience

JEL Codes: D57, E32, E61, F10, L14

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[†]U.S. Census Bureau, brian.c.fujiy@census.gov.

[‡]The World Bank, dghose@worldbank.org.

[§]University of California, San Diego, gakhanna@ucsd.edu.

1 INTRODUCTION

The ability of firms to substitute inputs across suppliers is critical for the resilience of supply chains and the transmission of supply shocks. If firms are unlikely to substitute across suppliers, shocks could amplify by transmitting further downstream and upstream through the supply chain. The importance of this mechanism was reflected during the Covid-19 pandemic, where supply chain disruptions drove dramatic reductions in GDP worldwide. For instance, India reported a -7.3% growth rate for the 2020/21 financial year, one of the most significant contractions worldwide and the largest decline in GDP since India’s independence.¹

In this paper, we quantify the importance of firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers (firms) of the same product category to explain large fluctuations in GDP. We provide new estimation strategies and estimates for these elasticities by leveraging regional variation in supply-side shocks induced by the Indian government’s massive lockdown policy. We explore explanations behind the magnitude of our estimated elasticity, showing that contract specificity of inputs, the level of inventories, and response time horizons matter. We show that this elasticity is key to partly explaining the large income declines during the Covid-19 pandemic. Using new big data computational techniques, we quantify this decline in GDP by directly leveraging information on the economy-wide firm-to-firm network, and highlight how protecting more connected firms mitigates output declines.

We pose two main research questions. First, are suppliers of intermediate inputs within a product category complements or substitutes?² The degree of complementarity or substitutability determines how shocks propagate through supply chains. We expect shocks to propagate less across firm networks if input suppliers are substitutable. However, if input suppliers are complements, the effects of adverse shocks can easily propagate through buyer-supplier networks. Second, we ask how this newly estimated elasticity affects firm-level sales, and ultimately GDP, by amplifying negative shocks through firm-level input-output linkages, and how the effect of the shock depends on the connectivity of affected firms.

Two unique features of our setting allow us to answer these questions credibly. First, India had a distinct mosaic of lockdown policies, whereby the roughly 600 districts were classified into three different zones with varying degrees of restrictions. This allows us to isolate variation in the

¹<https://www.economicsobservatory.com/how-has-Covid-19-affected-indias-economy>. More broadly, during the 2020/21 financial year, GDP fell by -3.3% in emerging market economies, and by -2.2% in developing countries.

²Complementarity in this setting means that a buyer’s expenditure share for a given supplier rises with the input price of that same supplier in the short run. That is, the buyer is unable to replace a sufficient amount of the input from the high-cost supplier with input from the lower-cost substitute to reduce the expenditure share attributed to the high-cost supplier.

ability to trade and transport goods over this period, thereby inducing variation in input prices at the supplier level. Second, we obtain new granular and high-frequency administrative data on the universe of firm-to-firm transactions for a state in India, with unique information on unit values and HS-product classifications. This previously unused data on prices and purchase quantities at the buyer-supplier level, combined with exogenous variation in prices induced by the lockdown, allows us to estimate new elasticities at the firm level and across different suppliers of a product.

We first document whether the lockdown indeed induced variation in prices we need to estimate these elasticities. We begin by presenting reduced-form evidence that leverages the nationwide, sudden, and unprecedented lockdown imposed by the Indian government in March 2020. Importantly, these lockdowns induced geographic variation: districts were categorized into *Green* (mild lockdown), *Orange* (medium lockdown), and *Red* (severe lockdown). Since the lockdowns were sudden and unexpected, they were likely implemented independent of economic fundamentals and induced strong variation in transactions between firms across India.³ We show, conditional on high-dimensional fixed effects, that these adverse supply shocks led to a sharp increase in unit values (prices), and dramatic fall in transactions of intermediate inputs, if either buyers or sellers were located in high lockdown zones.

We then estimate the elasticity of substitution across suppliers by leveraging the variation in prices we document in our reduced form. We do so by examining whether buyers were able to adjust their input expenditure shares away from the more affected suppliers towards the less affected suppliers (for a particular product). The elasticity of substitution across suppliers is thus quantified by studying the causal response of plant intermediate input use to changes in its supplier's intermediate input prices. Since causally estimating this elasticity requires tracing the slope of the buyers' input demand curves, we would need exogenous sources of variation in the supplier's marginal cost of production or transportation costs to estimate these elasticities.

Yet, Covid-19 was not just a supply shock. The pandemic outbreak was a combination of exogenous shocks to the quantities of factors supplied, the productivity of producers, and the composition of final demand by consumers across industries (Baqee and Farhi, 2020). To estimate the elasticity of substitution across suppliers of inputs, we leverage variation in input prices driven by the sudden restrictions in economic activity in lockdown districts where these suppliers were located. In addition, we leverage variation in trade costs arising from transportation restrictions in districts through which the goods need to pass from the seller to the buyer. While our instruments help derive the necessary variation, to further isolate supply shocks from other shocks, we control for an entire array of high-dimensional fixed effects, such as buyer-by-product-by-time level fixed effects to account for demand-side shocks, and product-specific shocks. Given the richness of our

³See the [BBC \(link\)](#), and [The Wire \(link\)](#)

data, we can also include seller-by-product fixed effects, or even seller-product-time fixed effects in our most stringent specifications. We additionally control for other factors, such as firms' exposure to foreign shocks transmitted through trade (Hummels et al., 2014), and the caseload and severity of Covid-19 cases.

We find that suppliers within the same HS-4 product category are highly complementary. Our estimated elasticity of substitution across suppliers of the same product is 0.55. In various specification tests employing different combinations of fixed effects and different sources of variation, we find that the estimated elasticities lie within a range of 0.50 to 0.66. Our new elasticities show that inputs across firms are highly complementary even within the same HS-4 product category. The elasticities are similar at the HS-6 and HS-8 product level.⁴ Additionally, we also estimate a more aggregate elasticity of substitution across different industries of 0.69, which implies complementarity across industries as in Atalay (2017) and Boehm et al. (2019).⁵

A challenge in the estimation of this elasticity arises if sellers and buyers decide to trade due to unobservable reasons. To account for this extensive margin, we leverage variation from counterfactual prices based on transactions that did not happen in a particular period. A counterfactual supplier of a buyer in a given year-month is defined as a supplier who has ever traded with that buyer in our sample period and supplies to other buyers but not to that particular buyer in that year-month. Given that we observe the unique prices at which sellers and buyers transact with each other, we can construct these counterfactual prices. We expand our estimating sample to include all counterfactual suppliers of a buyer, using counterfactual prices charged by the supplier to other buyers in the same time period.⁶ We continue to find that across all specifications, there is a high level of complementarity.

But why, in the short run, do buyers not substitute a lot away from high-cost suppliers? We investigate several candidate mechanisms. We argue that the elasticity is not a fixed exogenous parameter, but rather an empirical average across different types of firms and industries. First, we find that sellers that offer differentiated intermediate inputs exhibit higher complementarity. This lends support to the hypothesis that buyers may not be able to substitute because inputs are

⁴We use the term "product" and "product category" interchangeably and define whether we refer to HS-4, HS-6, or HS-8 codes when relevant. We use the term "industry" to refer to the broad HS Sections.

⁵The finding that the product-level elasticity is higher than the elasticity of substitution across suppliers is consistent with the macroeconomic and production networks literature which generally argues that the elasticity of substitution increases with the level of aggregation (Houthakker, 1955; Bachmann et al., 2024; Lagos, 2006). The key idea is that substitution may happen at a higher level than the individual production process or even individual firms (Bachmann et al., 2024). See Section 5.2 for more discussion on this.

⁶For the construction of these counterfactual prices to be relevant, the prices charged by a seller in a particular time should be approximately the same across all buyers, that is, the counterfactual price will be difficult to measure if the seller charges differential prices across buyers within the same year-month. We show evidence for this in Section 4.1.1 and in Figure A3 in the appendix.

often sourced from specific suppliers and customized, rather than bought “off-the-shelf” (Elliott and Golub, 2022). Second, we find that intermediate inputs purchased from buyers in locations with better institutional quality display higher complementarity. This reflects the importance of contract enforcement for the trade of more differentiated intermediate inputs. Third, in line with the previous literature, we find that the estimation of this elasticity is necessarily tied to the time horizon (Ruhl et al., 2008; Peter and Ruane, 2022). Allowing buyers a longer time to substitute—e.g., a quarter rather than a month—increases the value of the elasticity of substitution. Given the expectations that many large shocks may be short-lived, our estimates are relevant for short-run shocks rather than longer-term structural changes. Finally, we find that the level of inventory in the buyer’s industry helps to substitute inputs to some degree. When buyers are in industries with high levels of inventory, inputs across suppliers of the same product are less complementary, as the buyer can temporarily substitute a costly input from a seller with its input inventory holdings.

We recognize that our elasticity estimates should be thought of as an empirical average over industries, locations, and types of firms. That is, we do not think that the elasticity is a fixed exogenous parameter that applies to every buyer. Rather, it likely depends on various factors, such as the contracting structure and the enforcement of contracts, the level of inventories by industry, and the types of products produced. This is why our heterogeneity analysis adds much nuance to our understanding of why (on average) we find low substitutability.

Next, we outline a simple quantitative general equilibrium model of firm-to-firm trade à la Baqaee and Farhi (2019) with a production function augmented with substitution across suppliers within the same product category. The model simply serves as an illustration of the influence of the elasticity of substitution across suppliers for shock propagation through firm networks. Our model is intentionally parsimonious to fix ideas, but importantly, unlike standard trade models with Constant Elasticity of Substitution across products, it does not assume that suppliers of the same product are perfect substitutes.

Like Baqaee and Farhi (2019) our production function is CES and the production sector is perfectly competitive. In Section 6, we find no evidence to reject homotheticity in production, as expenditure shares do not vary non-linearly with relative prices. Section 5.1 tests our model’s market power assumption, showing no evidence of market power based on pair-wise buyer-seller bargaining (Alviarez et al., 2023) or the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. It is important to note that the estimate of complementarity across suppliers does not make our analysis inconsistent with market power. They are, however, not consistent with a simplified model of monopolistic competition where firms set prices by adding a constant markup to marginal cost based on the elasticity of substitution in demand. Although these simpler models are valuable in many other contexts involving market power, they are not well-suited for situations where the specific relationships between

buyers and sellers make substitution difficult (Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2024).⁷

We embed the estimated elasticities in our model and quantify how input complementarities at the firm level affect aggregate economic outcomes. Considering a firm’s full network is a highly computationally demanding task. In our case, it involves inverting a 94,555 by 94,555 input-output matrix.⁸ We apply state-of-the-art techniques from computer science to our input-output matrix to derive the full connectivity of each firm. Compared to our baseline case ($\epsilon = 0.55$), we find that the quarterly fall in GDP induced by a negative 25% shock to firms in *Red* zones would be 2.68pp less in a model where firms in the same HS-4 product category are substitutes ($\epsilon = 2$) and 0.99pp more when they are almost Leontief ($\epsilon = 0.001$).⁹ The additional losses due to firm-level complementarities translate into a GDP loss of 870 million USD, which is about 25 USD per capita per quarter, or about 3% of per capita per quarter average GDP of that state. Additionally, under our estimated elasticity, the shock to *Red* zone firms spreads widely through the network to other parts of the economy.

In our policy counterfactuals, we quantify the importance of firm connectivity separately from firm size and the effects of allowing the most connected firms (measured by all direct and indirect connections) to operate during lockdowns as opposed to allowing the most directly connected firms to operate. In policy and academic circles, much importance has been paid to large firms, as Hulten (1978) emphasized the importance of firm sizes in the propagation of shocks through production networks. We show that controlling for size, the fall in GDP is much larger if the most connected firms are affected compared to the least connected or a random set of firms. The importance of the most connected firms increases non-linearly with the size of the negative productivity shock and decreases as firms become more substitutable. Finally, we quantify how important it is to also consider a firm’s indirect connectivity and find that under our elasticity and a negative productivity shock of 25%, the fall in GDP would be 2.56pp less if the most connected firms were allowed to operate during the lockdowns compared to only allowing the directly connected firms (counting only the number of direct buyers) to operate.¹⁰ We see that as the shock gets larger, the difference in aggregate GDP between these two experiments rises, emphasizing the importance of measuring a firm’s indirect connections as well.

Related Work. Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on shock propagation and amplification through supply chains and production networks

⁷See Section 5.1, paragraph “Market power, variable prices, and bargaining” for a more detailed discussion on this.

⁸As a reference, the typical sector-level input-output matrix from the BEA 2012 is 405 by 405.

⁹We find that a 25% productivity shock to firms in *Red* zones reduces GDP by 10.95%. As an empirical benchmark, the state’s annual GDP fell by 11.3% in 2020/21.

¹⁰A firm’s indirect connections measure not only the number of direct buyers of a supplier but also the buyers’ buyers and their buyers, and so on.

(Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2018; Carvalho et al., 2021; Peter and Ruane, 2022; Boehm et al., 2019; Korovkin and Makarin, 2020; Ferrari, 2022; Dew-Becker, 2023; Huneeus, 2018; Arkolakis et al., 2023).¹¹ A crucial parameter determining the degree of shock propagation through supply chains is the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers within the same product category.

Existing work has estimated firm-level elasticities of substitution between product categories or between domestic and foreign industries (Peter and Ruane, 2022; Carvalho et al., 2021; Boehm et al., 2019; Atalay, 2017), but not the elasticity of substitution across suppliers of the same product code. The challenge highlighted by this literature in estimating the elasticity across suppliers within a product category lies in the fact that most firm-to-firm datasets do not contain product-level (unit) prices from each supplying firm to a buying firm, or lack the required variation in such prices to estimate these elasticities.¹² The lack of firm-level elasticities across suppliers has so far constrained our assessment of the importance of nodal firms, such as the most connected firms, in the propagation of shocks through production networks.

Our unique data and environment allow us to overcome these challenges credibly. First, India's lockdown policies allow us to isolate variation in the ability to produce and transport goods, which reflect variation in prices across suppliers. Second, our new granular and high-frequency administrative data on the universe of firm-to-firm transactions, has unique information on unit values and HS-product classifications. This previously unused data on prices and quantities, combined with exogenous variation in lockdown-induced prices induced, allows us to estimate new elasticities at the firm level and across different suppliers of a product.

We contribute to the literature in each of these dimensions. First, we measure unit values (prices) and quantities at the transaction (seller-buyer-product-time) level. We derive price changes from supply and transportation disruptions in lockdown-affected districts and estimate the firm-level elasticity of substitution between suppliers within a product category. We then quantify how this elasticity amplifies firm-specific supply shocks through a roundabout production network (Baqae and Farhi, 2019).¹³ Finally, given the presence of complementarity across suppliers of the same product, we address previously unanswered questions on the importance of firms' overall connectivity within a production network for the amplification of shocks. We leverage computational innovations in big data to compute the second-order effects of productivity shocks using the

¹¹See Bernard and Moxnes (2018) and Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019) for a comprehensive literature review.

¹²Carvalho et al. (2021) observe a binary measure of whether firms were connected via buyer-supplier relationships rather than quantities and unit values associated with such transactions. They use a proportionality assumption, which precludes estimating the elasticity of substitution across suppliers within a product category, as a buyer sourcing from two suppliers in the same industry will source the same amount given the assumption. Although lacking firm-to-firm price data, Dhyne et al. (2022) structurally estimate a similar elasticity in the context of imperfect competition models where they restrict the elasticity to be larger than 1 for mark-ups to be relevant.

¹³Prior work has highlighted the aggregate implications of supplier churn (Baqae et al., 2023; Khanna et al., 2022). We focus on the substitution among suppliers given a fixed set of suppliers as in Baqae and Farhi (2019).

entire matrix of production linkages between firms and industries. This innovation helps quantify the non-linear effects of productivity shocks *directly* using the network without relying on approximations using final sales.¹⁴

Our paper is also related to research on trade collapses during adverse shocks (Behrens et al., 2013; Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009; Bricongne et al., 2012), and shock transmission through GVCs during the Covid-19 pandemic via disruptions to imports, exports, or aggregate production (Bonadio et al., 2021; Baqaee and Farhi, 2020; Cakmakli et al., 2021; Demir and Javorcik, 2020; Gerschel et al., 2020; Heise, 2020; Lafrogne-Joussier et al., 2022; Bas et al., 2023; Chakrabati et al., 2021; Khanna et al., 2022; Miranda-Pinto et al., 2022). In contrast, we analyze how domestic transactions were affected during lockdowns in a large developing country. Our policy motivation stems from the observation that policymakers worldwide are interested in quantifying the trade-off between strict lockdowns that affect GDP through complex buyer-seller networks and more lenient measures that increase production and trade.

While we hesitate to use these elasticities for exercises on long-term structural transformations (Peter and Ruane, 2022), our estimates speak to responses to large unexpected shocks. Our paper has a limited discussion on the pandemic itself, as we simply rely on Covid-19 to generate identifying variation. Even beyond the Covid-19 crisis, our estimates of how substitutable suppliers are within a product category will help policymakers quantify the economy-wide effects of any disruptive events (e.g., natural disasters, wars, supply-chain disruptions, or sanctions) on trade and production that are expected to be reasonably short-lived.

2 DATA AND CONTEXT

Firm-to-firm trade. Our primary data source is daily establishment-level transactions with distinct information on establishment locations. While we use the term “firm” throughout the paper, our data is actually at the more granular establishment/plant level, and we can identify the parent firms for each establishment as well. This allows us to identify the precise location of each establishment. The data is provided by the tax authority of a large Indian state with a diversified production structure, around 50% urbanization rates, and high levels of population density. To benchmark the size of this Indian state to other firm-to-firm trade datasets, the population of this state is roughly three times the population of Belgium, seven times the population of Costa Rica, and double the population of Chile.

The data contains daily transactions between all registered establishments in this state and

¹⁴As firm-to-firm data become common (Panigrahi, 2021; Demir et al., 2024; Dhyne et al., 2021; Alfaro-Urena et al., 2022; Chacha et al., 2022), our methods can be used to quantify shock propagation through complex networks.

all registered establishments in India and abroad from April 2018 to October 2020.¹⁵ This data is collected by the tax authority’s *E-way Bill* system to increase compliance for tax purposes. This is an advantage over standard VAT firm-to-firm trade datasets in developing countries, which suffer from severe under-reporting. By law, anyone dealing with the supply of goods and services whose transaction value exceeds Rs 50,000 (700 USD) must generate E-way bills. Transactions with values lower than 700 USD can also be registered, but it is not mandatory. The E-way bill is generated before transport (usually via truck, rail, air, or ship), and the vehicle driver must carry the bill with them, or the entire extent of goods can be confiscated. Our data is generated from these bills. This implies that our network is representative of relatively larger firms, but the threshold is sufficiently low that we are likely capturing small firms as well.

Each transaction reports a unique tax code identifier for both the selling and buying establishments, all the items contained within the transaction, the value of the whole transaction, the value of the items being traded up to 8-digit HS codes,¹⁶ quantity of each item, unit, and mode of transportation. Each transaction also reports the ZIP code of both the selling and buying firms, which we use to merge with other district-level datasets.

Since the data report both value and quantity of traded items, we construct unit values for each transaction. We then calculate average unit values at the product-by-time-by-seller-by-buyer level, the number of transactions, and the total value of the goods transacted. This is the foundation of our firm-to-firm dataset used in the analysis.¹⁷


Lockdowns. On March 25, 2020, India unexpectedly imposed strict lockdown policies nationwide. Districts were classified into *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* zones according to each district’s severity of Covid-19 cases. Each color corresponds to different lockdown degrees, where *Red* was severe lockdown, *Orange* was medium lockdown, and *Green* was mild. Yet, at that time, there were barely any Covid-19 cases in India, as the entire country averaged about 50 cases a day (as opposed to about 400,000 cases a day the following year).

¹⁵Our analysis focuses on the periods between April 2019 and October 2020, surrounding the pandemic.

¹⁶The data partially reports items up to 8-digit HS codes. Until April 2021, in India, it was only mandatory to report 4-digit HS codes of goods traded (See the [Economic Times](#)). 97% of transactions report 4-digit HS codes, and 40% report 8-digit HS codes. Given this, our main specifications are based on 4-digit HS codes, and we show robustness using HS-8 codes. Sub-products within 4-digit HS codes are sufficiently similar for our purposes. For example, HS code 0905 is vanilla, 1508 are groundnut oils, and 1605 are crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved.

¹⁷In the large majority of cases, units are consistent at both the seller-by-buyer-product-by-month level or buyer-product-by-month level. The median number of units reported at the buyer-product-month level is 1, and the average number is around 1.1. We also calculate the level of concentration sales of a given a unit at the seller-buyer-product-month level. A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) close to 1 would imply that units are mostly consistent. The median HHI is 1, and average HHI is 0.97.

FIGURE 1: India's Covid-19 lockdown zones



Notes: The map shows the lockdown zones across Indian districts announced on March 25, 2020.

In Figure 1, we map the distribution of lockdowns across India. Districts in the *Red* zone experienced the strictest lockdowns, where rickshaws, taxis and cabs, public transport, barbers, spas, and salons remained shut. E-commerce was allowed for essential services. *Orange* and *Green* zone districts experienced fewer restrictions. *Orange* zones allowed the operation of taxis and cab aggregators, as well as the inter-district movement of individuals and vehicles for permitted activities. In addition to the activities allowed in *Orange* zones, buses were allowed to operate with up to 50% seating capacity and bus depots with 50% capacity in *Green* zones.¹⁸ Throughout the paper, we use this color scheme as the treatment across Indian districts. In particular, each treated firm is located in a *Red* or *Orange* district, while each control firm is located in a *Green* district.

Physical and cultural distance. We use different measures of *distance*, which we include as controls in our empirical results. The measures of geographic distance between districts calculate the length of the shortest distance between district centroids. The measure of linguistic distance between Indian districts is from Kone et al. (2018) using the commonly used ethnolinguistic fractionalization (EFL) index (Mira, 1964). This index measures the probability of two randomly chosen individuals from different districts speaking the same language.

¹⁸See the [Economic Times](#). On April 30, one *Red* zone district was reclassified to the *Green* zone, but we maintain the initial classification as it is likely to be more exogenous.

Other controls. We control for different firm and district-level time-varying variables such as data on the monthly number of cases, deaths, and recoveries from Covid-19 for all of India at the district level from [Covid India](#). For each firm, we construct two variables that measure the firm’s exposure to global demand and supply shocks that vary at the product and country level, following [Hummels et al. \(2014\)](#). The construction of these exposure variables is described in detail in online data Appendix C. Finally, we obtain data on inventories at the product-level, from the Prowess database collated by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).

Summary statistics. We present some key summary statistics from our firm-to-firm trade dataset in Tables A1-A4 and Figures A1-A2. They report the unique numbers of sellers and buyers, total sales (in million rupees), and total number of transactions during the months of January-March, April-June, and July-September for both 2019 and 2020. The most noticeable pattern is the large drop in all variables in 2020 compared to 2019, particularly during the April-June period, which coincided with the lockdown policies. The total value of sales and the number of transactions fell by almost 60% during April-June of 2020 compared to 2019.

The characteristics of the network, including measures of network in-degree (i.e., number of sellers per buyer) and outdegree (i.e., number of buyers per seller), are in Tables A2 and A3. Similar to other production network datasets, our network is sparse. In terms of network indegree, for 4-digit HS products, the median buyer has 2 suppliers per product but 6 suppliers on average with a standard deviation of 17. In terms of network outdegree, the median seller has 5 buyers but 64 buyers on average, with a standard deviation of 532. Finally, the sparsity of the network increases with the narrowness when defining a product and the frequency of the data.

To further understand the composition of economic activity of the Indian state of our analysis, in Table A4, we show the types of goods firms sell and buy and what fraction crosses state and country borders. In our state, firms are mostly in the business of selling vegetables, plastics, and minerals and buying machinery, metals, and vegetables. In terms of the type of trade, firms in our state are more likely to sell to other firms in the state. This contrasts with how firms in our state buy goods, where the share of purchases that come from within the state is almost the same as from other Indian states. Finally, international exports and imports represent a non-negligible but small share of sales and purchases.

Before using the lockdown variation to understand how firm-to-firm transactions are affected, we verify the stringency of these lockdowns in Figure A2 using Google mobility data. The data shows how the number of visitors to (or the time spent in) categorized places changes in comparison to baseline days. The baseline day is the median value from the 5-week period Jan 3 – Feb 6,

2020.¹⁹ Until the beginning of March 2020, there were essentially no differences in mobility trends across *Red*, *Orange*, or *Green* zones. But starting at the end of March 2020, we see that there is a substantial reduction in different types of activities (time spent in retail and recreation, grocery and pharmacy, parks, commuting, and workplaces) in *Red* zones compared to *Green* zones; with *Orange* zones in between. People in *Red* zones also spent more time at home than people in either *Orange* or *Green* zones. We notice that starting in August 2020, a few months after the centralized lockdown was over, these differences reduced, and by December 2020, these differences, especially in workplace mobility, become negligible.

3 REDUCED-FORM EVIDENCE

In this section, we outline a simple empirical specification to provide evidence showing the role of lockdown policies on key outcome variables for firm-to-firm trade. We show that the sudden Covid-19 lockdown policies between March and May 2020 led to a rise in unit values and a fall in the monthly number of transactions between firms.²⁰ In the next section, we exploit this variation to estimate firm-level elasticities of substitution across intermediate suppliers of the same product.

3.1 Empirical specifications

Our reduced-form specifications implement a difference-in-differences approach where we compare the unit values and the number of transactions both at the seller and seller-buyer level across *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* districts, before and after the lockdown. In our analysis at the seller level, the omitted (control) group are sellers located in *Green* districts and the base month is February 2020, the month before the lockdown enforcement. At the seller-buyer level, the omitted groups are sellers and buyers located in *Green* zones, and the base month is February 2020.

Seller-level regressions. We estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{s,i,t} = \omega_{o(s),i} + \omega_{i,t} + \sum_{t \neq 1} \beta_t Red_{o(s)} + \sum_{t \neq 1} \gamma_t Orange_{o(s)} + \mathbf{X}\delta + \epsilon_{s,i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{s,i,t}$ are either unit values or the log number of transactions for seller s of product i in month t , $\omega_{i,t}$ are product-by-time fixed effects, $\omega_{o(s),i}$ are product-by-district fixed effects (i.e. fixed

¹⁹See the [Google Covid-19 Community Mobility Reports](#).

²⁰To see a similar application of this empirical strategy for domestic violence and economic activity in India, see [Ravindran and Shah \(2020\)](#) and [Beyer et al. \(2021\)](#).

effects based on the district o where seller s resides). Product-by-time fixed effects control for any unobserved demand shocks at the product level. \mathbf{X} are controls that include the number of Covid-19 cases, deaths, recoveries, and exposure to international demand and supply shocks as discussed in Appendix C. We control for the Covid-19 cases and deaths since these are the variables on which the government based its lockdown decisions (Ravindran and Shah, 2020). The covariates of interest are $Red_{o(s)}$ and $Orange_{o(s)}$. The first is an indicator variable that equals 1 if seller s located in district $o(s)$ experienced a severe lockdown, 0 otherwise. The second equals 1 if seller s located in district $o(s)$ experienced a mid-level lockdown, 0 otherwise. The excluded category is $Green_o$ districts, where mild lockdown was imposed. The estimates of interest are β_t and γ_t . Our base time category is February 2020, just before lockdowns began. Standard errors are clustered at the seller's origin district level.

Seller-buyer level regressions. At the seller-buyer level, we estimate the specification:


$$Y_{s,i,b,t} = \sum_{(v,z) \in \Omega} \sum_{t \neq 1} \beta_t^{vz} \left(\gamma_{o(s)}^v \times \gamma_{d(b)}^z \right) + \delta_{o(s)} + \delta_{d(b)} + \delta_{i,t} + \beta_1 \log dist_{o(s),d(b)} + \mathbf{X}\delta + \epsilon_{si,b,t}, \quad (2)$$

where $Y_{s,i,b,t}$ are unit values or the number of transactions in logs between seller s of product i and a buyer b in time t . $\delta_{o(s)}$, $\delta_{d(b)}$, and $\delta_{i,t}$ are origin, destination, product-by-time fixed effects. $dist_{o(s),d(b)}$ is a vector of cultural and geographic distance variables, and \mathbf{X} are controls that include the number of Covid-19 cases, deaths, recoveries, and exposures to international demand and supply shocks. The first term of the right-hand side contains our estimates of interest. $(v,z) \in \Omega$ is a duple that contains the color y of seller's district, and the color z of buyer's district. Ω is the set that includes all pairs except $(Green, Green)$, such that this is the excluded category when estimating Equation (2). $\gamma_{o(s)}^v$ and $\gamma_{d(b)}^z$ are thus indicator variables that equal 1 when seller s is located in district o located in lockdown zone v , and when buyer b is located in district d located in lockdown zone z , respectively. The estimates of interest are β_t^{vz} . Our base time category is February 2020, just before lockdowns began. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination district levels.

3.2 Reduced-Form Facts

Fact 1: Sellers' unit values disproportionately rose, and trade fell in more severe lockdown zones. The first two panels of Figure 2 plot the coefficients β_t and γ_t from Equation (1), representing changes in log unit values and log number of transactions with respect to *Green* districts in February 2020 (the base category). In May 2020, sellers' unit values in *Red* districts rose by 25pp, and in *Orange* districts rose by around 10pp with respect to the base category.

FIGURE 2: Seller-level reduced-form event studies



Notes: This figure consists of 6 plots. Each plot shows estimates for β_t and γ_t from Equation (1). The estimated values are all in comparison to sellers in *Green* districts in February 2020. The dependent variable for the plots on the left-hand side is log unit values. The dependent variable for the plots on the right-hand side is the log number of transactions. Each row varies by the definition of a product-group and the fixed effects included in the regression. In the first row, a product is a 4-digit HS code, and the fixed effects are product-by-time and district. In the second row, a product is an 8-digit HS code, and the fixed effects are product-by-time and district. In the third row, a product is an 8-digit HS code, and the fixed effects are product-by-time and district-by-product. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All controls mentioned in the paper are included. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals.

At the same time, sellers' number of transactions in *Red* districts declined by around 20pp, and in *Orange* districts declined by around 3pp with respect to the base category. Additionally, as expected by the severity of the lockdown policies by color, the rise in unit values and fall in the number of transactions was larger for sellers in *Red* districts than for *Orange* ones. In both figures, we find no evidence of pre-trends, implying that there were likely no differences in the trends of unit values or number of transactions between *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* districts before the lockdown.

The middle two panels of Figure 2 repeat the same exercise with a finer product definition, using 8-digit HS codes. Results remain virtually the same. In the last row of Figure 2, we include a stronger set of fixed effects (e.g., district-by-product), and the results remain the same.

Fact 2: Equilibrium unit values rose, and the number of transactions fell in more severe lockdown zones. We now report the results from our seller-by-buyer-level specification. In Figures 3 and 4, we report the estimates for β_t^{vz} from Equation (2), where the estimates are in comparison to cases when both sellers and buyers were located in *Green* districts in February 2020.

In the first row of Figure 3, we plot the coefficients from regression (2) where the seller is in the *Red* zone, and the buyer is in *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* zones respectively. Similarly, in the second row of Figure 3, we plot the coefficients from regression (2) where the seller is in the *Orange* zone, and in the third row, we plot the coefficients from regression (2) where the seller is in the *Green* zone (and the buyer is in *Red* and *Orange* zones respectively).

There are two main takeaways from these figures. First, even after controlling for bilateral resistance terms, trade costs, and additional covariates, unit values rose, and the number of transactions fell with respect to the base category (both buyer and seller in *Green* zones). The rise in unit values was as much as 45pp, and the fall in transactions was as high as 12pp. Second, these changes seem proportional to the severity of the lockdowns for both sellers and buyers. For instance, transactions plummet for red zone sellers, relative to other sellers. Once again, there is no evidence of differential pre-trends across zones leading up to the shock.

Our two facts jointly imply that prices, where either sellers or buyers were located in *Red* districts, were higher during the lockdown compared to districts where the lockdowns were mild (*Green* zones). As such, the lockdown induced variation in prices that we will later leverage to estimate elasticities of substitution across intermediates.

FIGURE 3: Unit Value, Seller-Buyer-Level Regressions



Notes: This figure consists of 8 plots. Each plot shows estimates for β_t^{vz} from Equation (2). The values of the estimates are all in comparison to sellers and buyers both in *Green* districts in February 2020. The vertical line in January 2020 splits months into pre and post-lockdown. The dependent variable for the plots is the log unit value. A product is a 4-digit HS code. Regressions include product-by-time, origin, and destination-district fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination district levels. All controls mentioned in the paper are included. The color of the line denotes the color of the seller's district, while the color of the shaded 95% confidence interval denotes the color of the buyer's district.

4 ESTIMATING THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ACROSS SUPPLIERS OF THE SAME PRODUCT AND ACROSS PRODUCTS

In Section 3, we showed that during the lockdown, prices increased whenever the sellers were located in red and orange zones compared to their green-zone counterparts. Here, we examine whether buyers were able to adjust their input expenditure shares away from the more affected suppliers towards less affected suppliers (for a particular product). We thus estimate the elasticity of substitution across suppliers by quantifying the causal response of plant intermediate input use to

FIGURE 4: Number of Transactions, Seller-Buyer Level Regressions



Notes: This figure consists of 8 plots. Each plot shows estimates for β_t^{vz} from Equation (2). The values of the estimates are all in comparison to sellers and buyers both in *Green* districts in February 2020. The vertical line in January 2020 splits months into pre and post-lockdown. The dependent variable for the plots is the log number of transactions. A product is a 4-digit HS code. Regressions include product-by-time, origin, and destination-district fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination district levels. All controls mentioned in the paper are included. The color of the line denotes the color of the seller's district, while the color of the shaded 95% confidence interval denotes the color of the buyer's district.

changes in its supplier's intermediate input prices. In Equation 3 below, we estimate how spending shares on a given material input i from supplier s relative to total spending on input i change in response to changes in the relative price of input i from supplier s .

$$\log \left(\frac{PM_{s,i,bj}}{PM_{i,bj}} \right) = (1 - \epsilon) \log \left(\frac{p_{s,i,bj}}{p_{i,bj}} \right) + \log (\mu_{s,i,bj}), \quad (3)$$

where $PM_{s,i,bj}$ is the expenditure by buyer b producing product j on product i from supplier s . $p_{s,i,bj}$ and $x_{s,i,bj}$ are the corresponding prices and quantities, respectively. $PM_{i,bj}$ is the total expenditure by buyer b producing j on input i , across all sellers s . $p_{i,bj} = \left(\sum_{s'} (p_{s',i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{s',i,bj}) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$ is a Con-

stant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) price index, $PM_{s,i,bj} \equiv p_{s,i,bj}x_{s,i,bj}$, and $PM_{i,bj} \equiv \sum_s PM_{s,i,bj}$. $\log(\mu_{s,i,bj})$ is the error term. This is the underlying basis for our estimation of the firm-level elasticity of substitution parameter ϵ , as will be described in detail in Section 4.1. When elasticities are independent of the magnitudes of the price change, such as in a standard CES framework, and such price changes are exogenous, the coefficient $(1 - \epsilon)$ in Equation 3 identifies the elasticity of substitution across suppliers. Note that the results of this estimation procedure hold with any CES production function with an arbitrary number of nests as long as the lowest nest consists of suppliers within the same product. While CES has been the dominant production function used in the majority of the literature due to its tractability, empirical, and theoretical feasibility (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2018; Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019), it is less applicable if we expect a non-linear relationship between expenditure shares and relative prices, as in the case of non-homothetic production functions. In Section 6 we show evidence for the validity of the CES assumption in our setting.

Similar to previous work (Atalay, 2017; Peter and Ruane, 2022; Boehm et al., 2019; Carvalho et al., 2021), we additionally estimate the elasticity of substitution across products using the following estimating equation:

$$\log\left(\frac{PM_{i,bj}}{PM_{bj}}\right) = (1 - \zeta) \log\left(\frac{p_{i,bj}}{p_{bj}}\right) + \log(w_{i,bj}), \quad (4)$$

where $p_{bj} = \left(\sum_{i'} \left(p_{i',bj}^{1-\zeta} w_{i',bj}\right)\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}$ is a CES price index, $PM_{i,bj} \equiv p_{i,bj}x_{i,bj}$, and $PM_{bj} \equiv \sum_i PM_{i,bj}$. $\log(w_{i,bj})$ is the error term. This is our estimating equation for the firm-level elasticity of substitution ζ , which we take to the data, as described in Section 4.1.

4.1 Estimation Strategy

This section discusses how we estimate the primary elasticities in our model, the vector of parameters $\hat{\theta} = (\sigma, \alpha, \zeta, \epsilon)$. We set the elasticity of substitution between different consumption varieties $\sigma = 4$ (Broda and Weinstein, 2006), and the elasticity of substitution between labor and the composite intermediate input $\alpha = 0.5$ (Baqaee and Farhi, 2019). We now estimate the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers (ϵ) and the firm-level elasticity across products (ζ) leveraging variation in the lockdown zones.

4.1.1. Estimating equations for ϵ

We face two main challenges when estimating ϵ from Equation (3). The first challenge is that the input i price index faced by buyer b ($p_{i,bj}$) is a function of the unobservable importance of input suppliers ($\mu_{s,i,bj}$). To address this challenge, we follow two strategies. In the first one, we include buyer-product-time fixed effects that subsumes the unobserved terms. Note that, our unique data directly observes transaction level prices by product, allowing us to include buyer-product-time fixed effects. In the second one, we follow Redding and Weinstein (2020) and where the overall importance of a product in a buyer's input use remains constant, such that we can construct $p_{i,bj}$ solely as a function of prices $p_{s,i,bj}$. While using the first strategy, the buyer-product-time fixed effects absorb the price index, the second strategy yields a direct measure of the buyer-input level price index. This price index is useful when we later estimate the upper-nest elasticity of substitution across products, as elaborated in Section 4.1.2.

The second challenge arises if new buyer and seller relationships form, that is, the extensive margin of trade changes. To account for this extensive margin for the estimation, we construct and leverage variation in counterfactual prices. Our unique data allow us to construct prices of transactions that did not happen in a particular period because the seller did not trade with a certain buyer that period (but could have traded with the same buyer before or after).

Addressing unobservable importance of input suppliers through fixed effects As discussed, to address the first challenge of unobservable importance of input suppliers entering the price index, we follow two strategies. First, we estimate ϵ by including a product-buyer-time fixed effect ($\omega_{i,bj,t}$), as in Equation 5 below. This is a demanding specification that, for instance, absorbs any demand shocks at the buyer-by-product level. This includes, for example, shocks to retail demand and retail distribution costs for the buyer's products (Crucini and Davis, 2016). We can also include seller-by-product-by-time fixed effects, and solely rely on variation in the cost of transporting a particular product from a certain seller to a particular buyer.

$$\log \left(\widehat{PM}_{s,i,bj,t} \right) = \omega_{i,bj,t} + \omega_{s,i,t} + (1 - \epsilon) \log \left(\widehat{p}_{s,i,bj,t} \right) + X\delta + \xi_{s,i,bj,t} \quad (5)$$

We show coefficient stability across various sets of high-dimensional fixed effects and specifications. Across the various specifications, the wide array of high-dimensional fixed effects helps control for demand shocks (buyer-by-time fixed effects or buyer-by-product-by-time fixed effects), product-level changes in demand or supply (product-by-time fixed effects or buyer-by-product-by-time fixed effects), buyer-by-seller and product-specific time-invariant characteristics (buyer-by-product and seller-by-product fixed effects), and/or quality/supply shocks or time-varying markups

(seller-by-product-by-time fixed effects). The remaining variation isolates time-varying changes across sellers within a product category. Further, as we explain in Section 4.2, we strengthen this framework by leveraging the mosaic of Covid-19 lockdowns to derive exogenous policy-induced variation in relative prices.

Identifying Variation: In Section 4.2 below, we introduce two different instrumental variables strategies that leverage policy-induced variation in price shocks. Yet, the various high-dimensional fixed effects in the OLS formulation also speak to what is driving our identifying variation. Price variation may be driven by buyer-by-product specific shocks (buyer power, downstream demand shocks, etc.), seller-by-product specific shocks (changes in marginal cost of production, seller market power, etc.), or bilateral-product specific shocks (transportation costs). When conditioning on $\omega_{i,bj,t}$ we control for buyer-product-time shocks, including any demand shocks. When including seller-by-product fixed effects, we additionally control for time-invariant characteristics of a seller-product, but still allow for shocks (over time) to say the cost of production. Including $\omega_{s,i,t}$, further absorbs the shocks to the cost of production, and so the remaining variation is solely driven by buyer-seller-product-time level variation (e.g., shocks to transportation costs). While stringent and conservative, researchers may not wish to always control for $\omega_{s,i,t}$ as it may absorb part of what is good identifying variation, coming from changes in marginal costs. We show coefficient stability across all sets of fixed effects.

Addressing unobserved importance of input suppliers by directly constructing the price index: In our second method, we directly construct changes in aggregate prices $p_{i,bj,t}$. This approach is necessary because when estimating the elasticity of substitution across products in Section 4.1.2, we need to use this price index as the measure of the product-level price that a buyer faces. To construct these price indexes, we follow the method in Redding and Weinstein (2020), which assumes that the overall importance of a product in a buyer’s input use does not change between two consecutive periods, even though the importance of inputs from suppliers within a product category can change.²¹ This enables us to construct changes in price indices that are not dependent on $\mu_{si,bj,t}$, but are directly observed in the data (details in Appendix D.1.2). Under this assumption, we derive Equation 6, which links the overall expenditure share on a certain supplier

²¹This assumption requires that, for instance, a shoemaker’s overall preference for leather in shoe manufacturing does not change, although its preference for leather from certain suppliers can change. Demand shocks may change $\mu_{si,bj,t}$ (e.g., the demand for leather from certain suppliers), but the geometric mean of $\mu_{si,bj,t}$ across suppliers within a product is stable between t and $t - 1$.

s (as a share of total expenditure on product i) to the corresponding relative prices:

$$\log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{s,i,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}} \right) = \omega_{bj,t} + \omega_{i,t} + \omega_{bj,i} + \omega_{s,i} + (1 - \epsilon) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{s,i,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{s}_{i,bj,t}^* \right) + \mathbf{X}\delta + \xi_{s,i,bj,t}, \quad (6)$$

where $\widehat{v}_t = \frac{v_t}{v_{t-1}}$ are variables in changes to the previous month. $[\omega_{bj,t}, \omega_{i,t}, \omega_{bj,i}, \omega_{s,i}]$ is a set of fixed effects, including buyer-by-time, product-by-time, buyer-by-product, and seller-by-product fixed effects. $\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t} = \prod_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}^*}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} p_{s,i,bj,t}$ is a geometric mean of unit values across common suppliers, where $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* \equiv \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$ is the set of common suppliers for buyer b that appears in both the current and previous month, and $N_{i,bj,t}^* \equiv |\Omega_{i,bj,t}^*|$ is the number of common suppliers for buyer b in month t .

This strategy has three main advantages. First, it allows us to construct price indices $p_{i,bj,t}$ solely as a function of prices $p_{s,i,bj,t}$, independent of the unobservable importance of input suppliers $\mu_{s,i,bj,t}$. Second, under the same assumption, the constructed price indices $p_{i,bj,t}$ naturally generates two controls to be included in the estimation: the change in expenditure share $\widehat{s}_{i,bj,t}^* \equiv \frac{PM_{si,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}^*} PM_{si,bj,t}}$ and a [Feenstra \(1994\)](#) correction term $\lambda_{i,bj,t} \equiv \frac{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}^*} PM_{si,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}} PM_{si,bj,t}}$. The key control is the latter since it accounts for the entry and exit of sellers in product i for buyer b in period t . More details are in [Appendix D.1.3](#). Finally, as described in more detail in [Section 4.1.2](#), this strategy allows us to estimate the elasticity of substitution between products (ζ) by allowing us to construct the price index that buyer b faces for input i at time t . Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state levels. \mathbf{X} are controls, including exposure to foreign demand and supply shocks, the number and severity of Covid-19 cases, and geographic and cultural distance.

Accounting for the extensive margin of trade. In extensions, we further account for the extensive margin of trade. Our main estimating Equation 6 is estimated based on a firm's existing suppliers, and the elasticity of substitution ϵ dictates a buyer's ability to substitute inputs between its suppliers. Nevertheless, sellers and buyers may decide to trade for unobservable reasons, thus changing the extensive margin of trade. To account for this extensive margin for the estimation, we introduce the notion of a counterfactual supplier for a buyer. A counterfactual supplier of buyer b at time t is defined as a supplier who has ever traded with that buyer in our sample period and supplies to other buyers at month t , but not to that particular buyer at month t .

We expand our estimating equation to include all counterfactual suppliers of a buyer. A counterfactual supplier, therefore, accounts for potential suppliers of a buyer b at time t —suppliers who at some point traded or could trade with b and supplied inputs to other buyers in period t . A counterfactual supplier also accounts for supplier links of a buyer b that no longer exist in period

t , even though this supplier continues supplying to other buyers. While the expenditure share by buyer b on inputs from a particular seller s of product i can be zero in periods that the trade does not happen, in those periods, we still need the notion of a counterfactual price. The advantage of our data is that it uniquely reports transaction-level prices. As a result, we can construct counterfactual prices in those time periods as the average price that seller s would charge to other buyers, as given by Equation 7 below.

$$p_{s,i,bj,t} \equiv \frac{\sum_{s \in \bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t}} \sum_{b \in \Phi_{s \in \bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t}}} PM_{s,i,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t}} \sum_{b \in \Phi_{s \in \bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t}}} Q_{s,i,bj,t}}, \quad (7)$$

where $\bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t} \equiv \bar{\Omega}_{i,bj} - \Omega_{i,bj,t}$. $\Omega_{i,bj,t}$ is the set of sellers in product i that traded with buyer b in period t , $\bar{\Omega}_{i,bj}$ is the set of potential sellers with buyer b in product i .²² Therefore, $\bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t}$ is the set of counterfactual sellers as defined above.

$\Phi_{s \in \bar{\Omega}_{i,bj,t}}$ is the set of buyers that traded with seller s in product i in period t . For the construction of these counterfactual prices to be relevant, the prices charged by a seller at a particular time should be approximately the same across all buyers; that is, the counterfactual price will be difficult to measure if the seller charges different prices across buyers within the same year-month. In Figure A3, we plot the residuals from regressing prices on seller-by-product-by-time fixed effects. The figure shows that these residuals are concentrated around 0, suggesting that sellers do not charge different prices to different buyers for the same product within a year-month.

The estimating equation, after substituting the Feenstra (1994) term with the stronger buyer time fixed effects and accounting for the extensive margin of trade, is given below:

$$\log(PM_{si,bj,t}) = \omega_{i,bj,t} + \omega_{s,i} + (1 - \epsilon) \log(p_{s,i,bj,t}) + X\delta + \xi_{s,i,bj,t}. \quad (8)$$

To account for the zeros on the left-hand side of the estimating equation, we estimate ϵ via Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML).

4.1.2. Estimating equations for ζ

Now, to estimate ζ from Equation (4), there are two issues to address. First, notice that the price index $p_{i,bj,t}$ is a function of (unobservable) demand shocks $\mu_{si,bj,t}$, and ϵ , such that $p_{i,bj,t} \equiv \left(\sum_s \mu_{s,i,bj,t} p_{s,i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$. Second, the price index $p_{bj,t}$ is also a function of unobservable product-level demand shocks $w_{i,bj,t}$, making their computation challenging.

First, we construct price indices as $p_{i,bj,t} \equiv \left(\sum_s \mu_{si,bj,t} p_{si,bj,t}^{1-\hat{\epsilon}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\hat{\epsilon}}}$, where $\hat{\epsilon}$ is estimated previ-

²²The set of potential sellers of buyer b is constructed based on the buyer's purchase record between April 2018 and October 2020.

ously, $p_{si,bj,t}$ comes directly from the data, and demand shocks $\mu_{si,bj,t}$ are constructed recursively. This recursive construction of demand shocks comes from predicting residuals from Equation (6) and setting an initial value for shocks $\mu_{si,bj,0}$ (Appendix D.2.2).

Second, we construct buyer-level price indices $p_{bj,t}$ following Redding and Weinstein (2020). We assume that the overall importance of the composite intermediates at the product-level in the production function does not change between consecutive months. As such, we can construct this price independent of product-level demand shocks $w_{i,bj,t}$ after controlling for buyers' expenditure shares by product. More details are in Appendix D.2.1.

We then derive the following expression we take directly to the data:

$$\log \left(\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t} \right) = \omega_{bj,t} + \omega_{i,t} + \omega_{bj,i} + (1 - \zeta) \log \left(\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t} \right) + X\delta + \xi_{i,bj,t}, \quad (9)$$

where $[\omega_{bj,t}, \omega_{i,t}, \omega_{bj,i}]$ are a set of buyer-by-time, product-by-time, and buyer-by-product fixed effects, which again account for a wide array of demand shocks, product shocks, and buyer-product specific characteristics. \mathbf{X} are the same set of controls used before. $\tilde{p}_{bj,t} \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \tilde{p}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}}$ is the geometric mean of unit values across products that buyer b purchases, and $\tilde{s}_{bj,t} \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \tilde{s}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}}$ is the geometric mean of expenditure shares across products. Detailed derivations are in Appendix D.2.

4.2 Addressing endogeneity concerns

Despite the wide range of fixed effects, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of ϵ may still be biased if additional unobserved demand-side shocks (changing $\mu_{s,i,bj,t}$) drive changes in prices and expenditure shares. The firm-level elasticity of substitution is a function of the slope of the buyer's input demand curve, and hence, simultaneous shifts in the demand and supply curves induced by the Covid-19 shock would bias our estimates. For example, if Covid-19 induced demand shocks led to contractions in buyers' income and, at the same time, supply shocks led to contractions in the sellers' supply, the demand curves will look flatter (estimated ϵ higher) compared to the unbiased value of ϵ . Additionally, measurement error in input prices, proxied by unit values, may induce attenuation biases.

Our estimation strategy, therefore, involves using the sudden demarcations of lockdown zones that restrict economic activity in certain Indian districts as an instrumental variable when estimating this equation in two-stage least squares (2SLS). We use the disruptions in prices caused by sudden lockdowns that made it costlier for sellers in *Red* and *Orange* zones to produce and send their intermediate goods. The idea is that, after controlling for the wide array of fixed effects, the

lockdown zones the buyers are located in, exposure to international demand and supply shocks, and the number and severity of regional Covid-19 cases, the remaining variation in prices facing a buyer are driven by supply shocks induced by policy-mandated sudden changes in the seller's lockdown zones. In addition, since the goods from the seller to the buyer have to transit through several districts located in different lockdown zones facing different severity in the movements of trucks and border controls, changes in the costs of transportation induced by these lockdowns provide another source of exogenous variation to estimate the firm-level elasticity of substitution.

To formalize the intuition behind our identification strategy, suppose that prices can be separated between prices at the origin and a trade cost, such that

$$\log(\hat{p}_{s,i,bj,t}) = \log(\hat{\tau}_{s,bj,t}) + \log(\hat{p}_{s,i,t}).$$

Here we can see the types of variation that drive the two types of instruments we use. First, exogenous shifters to prices at the seller level $p_{s,i,t}$, such as economic restrictions induced by the lockdown zone the seller is located in. Second, exogenous shifters at the seller-buyer level, for example, changes in transportation costs $\tau_{s,bj,t}$ driven by the lockdown zones of the districts the goods pass through. We now describe each of these instruments and then implement them within our estimation strategy.

Seller-level instruments. We derive supply-side shifters to obtain unbiased elasticities of substitution. Shocks induced by the Covid-19 lockdown policies that only impact sellers provide this variation. In Equation (10) below, we formalize this intuition.

$$\log(\hat{p}_{s,i,t}) = \beta^{R,p} Red_{o(s)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,p} Orange_{o(s)} Lock_t + \nu_{s,i,t}^p, \quad (10)$$

where $Lock_t$ is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the months from March to May of 2020, which are the months when the lockdown policies were implemented, 0 otherwise, and $Red_{o(s)}$ and $Orange_{o(s)}$ are indicator variables that equal 1 whenever seller s was located in *Red* or *Orange* districts, respectively.

Seller-Buyer-level instruments. The transportation of supplies from the location of the supplier to the buyer requires going through different districts, each of which is affected by lockdown policies in different ways. Intuitively, a route containing more *Red* districts should increase the cost of transportation compared to a route with no *Red* districts. We construct instruments that capture that idea. We allow trade costs to change over time so that we can leverage the Covid-19

lockdown policy. In particular, as we describe in Appendix D.1.4, we assume

$$\log(\widehat{\tau}_{s,bj,t}) = \sigma \log(\widehat{TravelTime}_{s,bj,t}).$$

We leverage the Covid-19 lockdown as an exogenous shifter that only influences travel time between locations of seller s and buyer b , as reflected in Equation (11) below.

$$\log(\widehat{\tau}_{s,bj,t}) = \beta^{R,\tau} Red_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,\tau} Orange_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \nu_{s,bj,t}^{\tau}. \quad (11)$$

Detailed derivations and estimating equations are in Appendix D.1.4. $Red_{o(s)d(b)}$ and $Orange_{o(s)d(b)}$ are the share of districts designated as *Red* and *Orange*, respectively, along the route between seller s and buyer b . We construct these variables using the Dijkstra algorithm for least-cost routes. Details about the implementation of this algorithm are in Appendix C.

Finally, we instrument the changes in relative prices in Equation (9) to estimate ζ . Potential unobservable product-level demand shocks could again induce an upward bias to OLS estimates of ζ . To construct our instruments, we leverage the seller-level and seller-buyer-level instruments we used to estimate ϵ and calculate weighted averages across suppliers to instrument for the change in relative prices for buyers. The intuition is that buyers that purchased inputs either from a larger share of sellers in *Red* zones, or from sellers located in districts such that the trading routes comprised of many *Red* zone districts were more exposed to supply disruptions induced by the Covid-19 lockdowns. More details of the instruments are in Appendix D.2.3.

LATE and Balance Tests. The instruments induce buyers of certain types to be more affected than others based on their production networks. The Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) may not represent the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) if buyers in *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* zones already traded intensively with sellers in certain lockdown zones, and there is heterogeneity in responses. For instance, if buyers in *Red* traded mostly with sellers in *Red*, then our instrument may estimate effects on firms induced by having more *Red* sellers, thus upweighting effects on buyers in *Red*. In Figure A4, we run two distributional checks to investigate these patterns. These figures show that, in general, sellers from *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* zones had similar interactions with buyers from *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* zones.

We also consider whether certain products are sourced intensively from firms located in certain zones. For instance, if all the rubber supply of firms in this production network comes from suppliers in *Red* zones, then buyers of rubber would find it increasingly difficult to find suppliers. Once again, if there is heterogeneity in responses by product category, our estimated

LATE elasticity would weigh rubber products higher than non-rubber products. While not a source of bias, it does affect the interpretation of the estimated parameter. In Figures A4g and A4h, we plot the shares of total purchases of each industry (HS Section) that are sourced from firms in *Red*, *Orange*, and *Green* zones. Except for the small HS industry 19 (arms and ammunition), there is no noticeable degree of concentration of suppliers from any particular zone.

Fixed Effects: Finally, in all our implementation of the 2SLS, we incrementally include high-dimensional fixed effects, and show coefficient stability, just as we do for the OLS. For instance, we include buyer-by-product-by-time fixed effects that control for any demand shocks, such as the buyers also being affected by Covid-19 lockdowns. This is important to do, as the Covid-19 shock was far-ranging and may have hypothetically affected demand as well. While we show balance in the network characteristics by type of zone, we think it is still important to include such buyer-product-time fixed effects. Like in the OLS, we also include seller-product fixed effects that control for any seller-product specific time-invariant characteristics. In our most stringent specification, we include seller-product-time fixed effects, and rely only on variation coming from the transport costs between the sellers and buyers (i.e., the bilateral IV). This last specification, while stringent, controls for any seller-by-product specific shocks.

5 ELASTICITY ESTIMATES

In this section, we show the results of the estimation of both firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers within a product category, and then across product categories.

5.1 *Firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers*

First, we report OLS estimates in Table 1. In columns (1)-(3), we progressively include stronger sets of fixed effects. In column (1), we include both buyer-by-time and product-by-time fixed effects, as well as the Feenstra term. In column (2), we also include buyer-by-product and seller-by-product fixed effects. In column (3), we include buyer-by-product-by-time and seller-by-product fixed effects. Notice that in column (3), the former set of fixed effects absorbs the Feenstra term. The implied elasticities exhibit values between 0.70 and 0.78 across the different specifications.

To test whether our estimates vary by product aggregation, in columns (4)-(7), the estimates are based on 6-digit and 8-digit HS codes. The elasticities range between 0.66 and 0.78, so the estimates do not meaningfully change. Since these elasticities are below 1, these estimates suggest that, at the firm level, suppliers act as complements rather than substitutes for buyers. This is

important for aggregate incomes since, as shown in Equation 18 in Section 7, which outlines a simple production network model à la Baqaee and Farhi (2019), we see that when second-order effects are considered, an elasticity of substitution less than 1 implies that the aggregate impacts of negative shocks are amplified.

TABLE 1: OLS, firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.2171 (0.0133)	0.2222 (0.0147)	0.3045 (0.0151)	0.2114 (0.0192)	0.3030 (0.0196)	0.2441 (0.0352)	0.3370 (0.0365)
ϵ	0.7828	0.7777	0.6954	0.7885	0.6969	0.7558	0.6629
R^2	0.417	0.460	0.404	0.478	0.411	0.495	0.420
Obs	2028039	1966591	991187	2021334	816122	993583	341903
HS digits	4	4	4	6	6	8	8
Feenstra term	Y	Y		Y		Y	
Buyer-time FE	Y	Y		Y		Y	
Product-time FE	Y	Y		Y		Y	
Buyer-product FE		Y		Y		Y	
Buyer-product-time FE			Y		Y		Y
Seller-product FE		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: OLS estimates come from estimating Equation (6). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. The first row reports the estimates associated with changes in log relative unit values. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ , which is 1 minus the estimate on the first row. The table contains seven columns: Each corresponds to different specifications on how we define a product (4-digit, 6-digit, or 8-digit HS codes), which fixed effects are included, and whether the Feenstra (1994) term is included. These combinations are reported by the last seven rows of the table. All specifications include the controls mentioned in the paper.

Nevertheless, as we described previously, the OLS estimates may be contaminated by simultaneous demand and supply shocks that happened during Covid-19. In Table 2, we report 2SLS estimates based on our proposed instruments. We find evidence that inputs across different suppliers of a firm within the same 4-digit HS product category are highly complementary, ranging from 0.50–0.66, depending on the set of fixed effects and instruments we use.²³ Our preferred specifications are column (3) and (5) with an elasticity of 0.55, where we use both the seller and the seller-buyer level instrument, essentially deriving variation from both sellers’ production costs and transportation costs. We include buyer-by-time and product-by-time fixed effects that account for time-varying demand shocks and also account for firm entry and exit with the Feenstra (1994) term. Each specification reports a high Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, indicating that our instruments are statistically relevant. In columns (1) and (2), we use the seller-level and seller-buyer-level instruments separately. The elasticities are 0.50 and 0.61, respectively, which also reflect complementarity. In column (4), we also include buyer-by-product and seller-by-product fixed effects,

²³In Table A11, we show similar patterns for HS-6 and HS-8 categories as described in Section 6.

and the elasticity rises to 0.66. Columns (5)-(6) show that our complementarity results remain after including stronger sets of fixed effects. Finally, column (7) is our strongest specification that also includes seller-by-product-by-time fixed effects. This specification absorbs our seller-level instrument, such that only our bilateral instrument prevails. Even under this stringent specification, we find an elasticity of around 0.64. Therefore, all our estimates provide evidence for $\epsilon < 1$.

TABLE 2: 2SLS, firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.5042 (0.2129)	0.3945 (0.0933)	0.4538 (0.1389)	0.3409 (0.1068)	0.4418 (0.1982)	0.3535 (0.1701)	0.3572 (0.1435)
ϵ	0.4957	0.6054	0.5461	0.6590	0.5581	0.6464	0.6428
Obs	2854292	2028039	2028039	1966591	1020362	991187	676923
K-PF	48.232	133.688	143.413	248.977	69.827	62.215	28.37
Seller IV	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	
Bilateral IV		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Feenstra term	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Buyer-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Product-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Buyer-product FE				Y			
Seller-product FE				Y		Y	
Buyer-product-time FE					Y	Y	Y
Seller-product-time FE							Y

Notes: 2SLS estimates come from estimating Equation (6). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. The set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they traded in both the current and previous month. The first stage uses either bilateral or seller-level instruments, as reported in rows six and seven. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), and seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). The first row reports estimates associated with changes in relative unit values in logs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ , which is 1 minus the estimate on the first row. The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic from the first stage. A product is a 4-digit HS code, and the treatment period is March-May 2020. The table contains seven columns. Each column corresponds to different combinations of instruments, fixed effects, and whether the [Feenstra \(1994\)](#) term is included. These combinations are reported in the last nine rows. All specifications include the controls mentioned in the paper.

Importantly, we should note that a low ϵ does not imply that when the price of a seller's input rises, a buyer purchases less from a different seller. Instead, it indicates that the buyer is unable to replace a sufficient amount of the input from the high-cost supplier with one from the lower-cost substitute to lower the expenditure share attributed to the high-cost supplier.

2SLS vs OLS. The 2SLS estimates for ϵ are smaller than the OLS estimates. As discussed in Section 4.2, the bias is in the expected direction if we expect the Covid-19 shock to also induce

negative demand shocks, thereby biasing up OLS estimates of ϵ . We may expect that our estimated elasticity will be lower for the sub-sample of buyers who did not have more than one supplier to source inputs from. In Table A5, we restrict our sample to cases when a buyer traded with at least two sellers in two consecutive periods. Column (5) again yields an elasticity of substitution of 0.56, very close to the estimate from our main specification.

Extensive margin. To account for the extensive margin, we show results from estimating Equation 8 in Table A6. Again, we find evidence of high levels of complementarity, with the estimated elasticities ranging from 0.23-0.25 depending on the range of fixed effects used.

Market power, variable prices, and bargaining. Our estimates of the elasticity of substitution across suppliers is consistent with a model with CES production where the production sector is perfectly competitive, as outlined in Section 7. We abstract from market power (Dhyne et al., 2022; Edmond et al., 2023; Alviarez et al., 2023), since our data suggests that the market structure in this Indian state is highly competitive in general. The median HHI across 4-digit HS product categories is 0.1041, which implies a low level of market concentration within a product category.

Furthermore, in our data, we see that for a particular product, sellers charge all buyers the same price (conditional on distance). That is, there is unlikely to be variable pricing or bargaining that meaningfully drives price variation. Figure A3 shows that regardless of whether the product is defined at the HS4 or HS8 level, there is little variation in prices across buyers for the same year-month and seller-product.²⁴ This suggests that buyer-seller specific bargaining power is not significant in our setting.

However, it is important to note that the estimate of complementarity across suppliers does not make our analysis inconsistent in economies with some form of market power. They are, however, not consistent with a simplified model of monopolistic competition where firms set prices by adding a constant markup to marginal cost based on the elasticity of substitution in demand. It is because in such a scenario, the marginal revenue would be negative. These models of monopolistic competition have to assume that the elasticity of substitution across products and/or suppliers is greater than 1. While useful in many other instances of market power, these models are not suitable in situations where specific relationships between buyers and sellers make substitution difficult, such as discussed in Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi (2024).

Indeed, as Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi (2024) show, market power does not necessarily

²⁴We estimate a regression of seller-product-buyer-year-month level prices on distances between buyer and seller and seller-product-year-month FEs and plot the residuals in Figure A3. For any HS code (HS4/HS6/HS8), these residuals are tightly distributed across 0, which suggests that sellers are not charging systematically differentiated prices across buyers for the same product in the same year-month.

appear in price setting in the form of mark-ups. Instead, all inputs are priced at marginal cost, but firms earn positive profits in equilibrium via lump-sum transfers from their customers, the magnitudes of which are determined by pairwise bargaining power. One of the key assumptions in their paper, in fact, *requires* inputs to be gross complements or at least weak substitutes.

In many ways, therefore, our estimates of complementarity are *consistent* with various models of market power. In Section 7 below, we do present a simplified, parsimonious model without market power, just to fix ideas and perform counterfactual exercises. Nevertheless, our elasticity estimates can also be broadly applied in other contexts that involve responses to short-term shocks.

Variation in ϵ . We do not think that the elasticity is a fixed exogenous parameter that applies to every buyer. Our framework is intentionally parsimonious, but we recognize that our elasticity estimates should be thought of as an empirical average over industries, locations, and types of firms. ϵ likely depends on various factors, such as the contracting structure and the enforcement of contracts, the level of inventories by industry, and the types of products produced. In Section 6 below, we show detailed heterogeneity analysis that unpacks mechanisms behind why (on average) we find low substitutability.

5.2 *Firm-level elasticities of substitution across products*

In Table 3, we report our estimates for the firm-level elasticity of substitution across products. In column (1), we show the OLS estimate of $\zeta = 0.92$, which reflects complementarity between product categories. In columns (2) and (3), we define products more granularly. In this case, the elasticities are around 0.80, which also reflects complementarity between products.

In columns (4)-(6), we report our estimates of ζ under 2SLS estimation after using a weighted average of instruments across buyers' sellers as discussed in Section 4.2. Our specification in column (4) reports a value of 0.69, reflecting that simultaneous negative demand and supply shocks during Covid-19 led to an underestimation of ζ under OLS. This elasticity is higher than the 2SLS elasticity of substitution across suppliers for the same product ($\epsilon = 0.55$), reflecting a lower degree of complementarity across products compared to suppliers. This finding is consistent with the macroeconomics and production networks literature which generally argue that the elasticity of substitution increases with the level of aggregation (Houthakker, 1955; Bachmann et al., 2024; Lagos, 2006). The key idea is that substitution may happen at a higher level than the individual production process or even individual firms (Bachmann et al., 2024). An example from Bachmann et al. (2024) illustrates how, during World War II, Germany faced a petrol crisis after being cut off from its main suppliers, leading to the adaptation of up to 500,000 civilian vehicles with wood-

TABLE 3: Firm-level elasticity of substitution across products

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.0842 (0.0039)	0.2014 (0.0045)	0.1996 (0.0048)	0.3136 (0.1060)	0.1712 (0.0040)	0.1996 (0.0048)
ζ	0.9157	0.7985	0.8003	0.6863	0.4368	0.4721
Obs	1292329	794376	766804	1292329	794376	766804
K-PF	.	.	.	27.284	17.950	15.868
R^2	0.3155	0.3554	0.3898	.	.	.
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
HS digits	4	8	8	4	8	8
Product-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Buyer-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Buyer-product FE			Y			Y

Notes: The estimates come from estimating Equation (4). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. Price indices are constructed by recovering the residuals when estimating ϵ and the estimates of ϵ . The first three columns are OLS estimates of ζ . The last three columns are 2SLS of estimates of ζ using weighted averages of both bilateral and seller-level instruments across sellers. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), and seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). Each column corresponds to a different combination of fixed effects and HS codes. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) correspond to our preferred specification when estimating ϵ for 4-digit and 8-digit HS codes. Additionally, in columns (3) and (6), we also include buyer-by-product fixed effects. The first row reports the estimates associated with changes in log relative unit values. Standard errors are clustered at the buyer's district level and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ζ , which is 1 minus the estimate on the first row. The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic from the first stage for the 2SLS estimators. The sixth row reports the R^2 for the OLS estimators. The seventh row denotes whether the estimates are obtained through OLS or 2SLS. The eighth row reports the HS code. The last three rows indicate the combination of fixed effects.

burning devices.²⁵

In columns (5) and (6), similar values for this elasticity hold when we define a product as an 8-digit HS code, and after the inclusion of buyer-by-product fixed effects. Finally, first-stage F-stats are high, which reflects the statistical relevance of our weighted averaged instruments.

Unlike the elasticity of substitution across suppliers within a product category, there have been previous attempts in the literature to estimate the elasticity of substitution across products or industries. In particular, other work has estimated a wide range of values for parameters akin to ζ depending on the aggregation of the industry and the research question. Our elasticity is close to [Boehm et al. \(2019\)](#), who estimate an elasticity across HS-10 products that lies between 0.42 – 0.62 for non-Japanese affiliates and 0.20 for Japanese affiliates. [Atalay \(2017\)](#) finds an estimate of around 0.10 for 30 aggregated industries using US data.

²⁵See [Bachmann et al. \(2024\)](#) for a long list of such examples where substitution is possible at a more aggregate level (across products) but not necessarily across suppliers within a particular product.

6 WHY ARE SUPPLIERS COMPLEMENTARY IN THE SHORT-RUN?

Our estimates indicate that a buyer’s expenditure share for a given supplier rises with the input price of that same supplier in the short run. This suggests that buyers cannot easily substitute away from the input supplied by this specific supplier. Note that this does not necessarily mean that when the price of a seller’s input rises, a buyer purchases less from a different seller. Instead, it indicates that the buyer is unable to replace a sufficient amount of the input from the high-cost supplier with one from the lower-cost substitute to lower the expenditure share attributed to the high-cost supplier.

The inability of the firm to substitute suppliers in the short run goes in line with other studies arguing that it is hard for firms to substitute across different *products* in the short-run (Boehm et al., 2019; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2018). We show that this inability to substitute exists even when we consider individual suppliers of the same product. In this section, we explore different possibilities that can explain this complementarity result. In the process of unpacking mechanisms, we document relevant heterogeneity in the elasticity estimates. The first aspect of heterogeneity we examine is whether our elasticity estimates vary with the magnitude of the price shock, thereby testing the validity of the CES assumption in our setting.

Validity of the CES assumption. We estimated constant elasticities of substitution across suppliers within the same HS code. We now investigate whether our elasticities vary by the size of the price change (i.e., size of the shock). As we show in Figure 2, the price changes are higher for more severe lockdowns. If the magnitude of the elasticity is correlated with larger price changes, it may violate the CES assumption. To test for this potential concern, in Equation (12) we estimate a modified version of Equation (6), where we allow for the elasticity ϵ^v to vary across the lockdown zone v of the seller:

$$\log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{s,i,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}} \right) = \omega_{bj,t} + \omega_{i,t} + \omega_{bj,i} + \omega_{s,i} + (1 - \epsilon^v) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{P}_{s,i,bj,t}}{\widehat{P}_{i,bj,t}} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{s}_{i,bj,t}^* \right) + \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \xi_{s,i,bj,t} , \quad (12)$$

where ϵ^v is the elasticity of substitution across sellers within the same product in lockdown zone $v = \{Orange, Red\}$, with respect to sellers in *Green* lockdown zones. We report the results in the first two columns of Table A7. For sellers in districts with severe lockdowns, we find an elasticity of 0.53. Whereas, for sellers in mid-sized lockdowns (orange zones) we estimate an elasticity of 0.69. A t-test between the two estimates cannot reject that these two estimates are the same.

As such, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the elasticity of substitution across sellers within the same product varies with the size of the price change.

Institutional Quality and Input Specificity. Our complementarity result may arise if inputs are often sourced from specific suppliers and customized, rather than bought “off-the-shelf”.²⁶ Relatedly, specialized inputs have a greater need for contract enforcement in trade, and so rely on stronger court institutions.

We test these two hypotheses. First, we study whether intermediate inputs that are differentiated (i.e., relationship-specific) display higher complementarity. To test this hypothesis, we estimate our firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers conditional on whether the seller offers an intermediate input classified as either “Differentiated” or “Homogeneous” according to [Rauch \(1999\)](#).

Second, we study whether intermediate inputs that require highly-specified contracts and, therefore, are likely to be traded in locations with better institutional quality display higher complementarity ([Boehm, 2022](#); [Boehm and Oberfield, 2020](#)). To test this hypothesis, we use the geographic variation in institutional quality across Indian districts. We classify districts into terciles (*Low*, *Medium*, and *High*) according to the average time it takes for courts in each Indian district until a first hearing from the [DevData Lab](#) database, and we estimate our firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers conditional on whether buyers are located in each of these terciles of institutional quality.

In the last five columns of Table [A7](#), we report 2SLS estimates of our elasticity by input specificity and institutional quality. In the first two columns, we focus on input specificity. As expected, we find an elasticity of substitution across suppliers for differentiated inputs of 0.62, and for homogeneous inputs of 1.07. The higher degree of complementarity of input suppliers for differentiated goods, in comparison to homogeneous goods, reflects the importance of customized products that typically require durable relationships between buyers and sellers. Instead, for homogeneous inputs, the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1.

The last three columns focus on institutional quality. We find an elasticity of substitution across suppliers located in low-quality districts of 0.80, which is higher than the elasticity for suppliers located in high-quality districts of 0.37. The elasticity of substitution across suppliers located in medium-quality districts is 0.58, which is just in between the previous two estimates. This positive relationship between the degree of complementarity and the quality of institutions reflects the fact that places with better contract enforcement facilitate trade with more specialized

²⁶For instance, in [Elliott and Golub \(2022\)](#), firms need specific knowledge about input requirements and capabilities from their trading partners and therefore need an ongoing relationship to overcome moral hazard problems.

inputs that are harder to substitute.

Industry-Specific Elasticities. An alternative way to test for the role of input-specificity for our complementarity result is to check whether firms that source highly specific intermediate inputs (e.g., processed foods or art) should report a lower elasticity of substitution across suppliers than firms that source from more general inputs (e.g., textiles or jewelry). We analyze whether the degree of substitution across suppliers varies by industry (HS section). In Table A8 and Figure A5, we show the estimates of this elasticity of substitution across suppliers by twenty-one broad industries. We find that the OLS elasticity of substitution across suppliers by industry lies in the range of 0.41–0.87. Once we instrument for the unit values with the Covid-induced lockdown variation, we find that there is wider heterogeneity across industries. These reflect industry-specific ease of finding alternatives. For instance, *Art* yields the lowest elasticity of 0.149, perhaps as it reflects seller-specific products, whereas *Jewelry* yields the highest elasticity of 1.372, perhaps as gold and silver are not particularly seller-specific.

Longer-run elasticities of substitution across suppliers. Our estimates and identification strategy are only applicable in the short run since the lockdowns only lasted for three months. But the elasticity of substitution is necessarily tied to the time horizon (Ruhl et al., 2008; Peter and Ruane, 2022). We estimate a short-run elasticity (monthly), so we allow firms a month to adjust expenditures in response to price shocks. A potential avenue of exploration is to understand how this elasticity changes with the frequency of the measurement. To do this, we estimate our elasticities after aggregating the data at the quarterly level, so we allow firms a quarter to adjust expenditures in response to price shocks.

In Table A9, we report OLS and 2SLS estimates of the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers at both frequencies. The first two columns show our baseline estimates of ϵ at a monthly frequency. They correspond to column 1 from Table 1 and column 3 from Table 2. The last two columns show the estimates of ϵ at a quarterly frequency. As expected, the estimates at quarterly frequency are slightly higher than the monthly frequency ones: the OLS estimates go up from 0.78 to 0.86, and the 2SLS estimates go up from 0.55 to 0.79. Our quarterly estimates still exhibit complementarity in production since they are below 1.

Indeed, this analysis suggests that while longer-run elasticities may suggest a relatively higher degree of substitutability, the elasticities still continue to display complementarity. This is despite us continuing to consistently control for changes in demand (with buyer-product-time fixed effects). It is, of course, possible that much longer time horizons will generate larger elasticities. Yet, we should think of our estimates as being relevant for responses to short-term shocks, such as

pandemic-induced lockdowns, weather and climate shocks, wars, disasters, supply-chain disruptions, and unexpected policies. These would be in contrast to a permanent (or long-term) one-time shock to the network. For instance, in short-lived shocks, firms may attempt to ‘weather the storm’ and hold on to its suppliers (Castro-Vincenzi et al., 2024). A large literature has documented that there are fixed costs of forming new relationships which could deter firms from changing suppliers in the face of adverse shocks (Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2024; Dhyne et al., 2023).

Inventories. Inventories of intermediate inputs allow firms to absorb unforeseen shocks to input deliveries without an impact on production (Boehm et al., 2019). Do firms in industries that typically hold higher inventories have an easier time substituting across inputs from different suppliers? To test this hypothesis, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between suppliers conditional on sellers or buyers belonging to industries of “Low” or “High” inventory.

In Table A10, we show the results disaggregated by four types of industries: Industries where sellers typically hold high and low inventories (above or below median inventory-level across all industries) and industries where buyers typically hold high and low inventories. We find that, indeed, when buyers are in industries with high levels of inventory, inputs across suppliers of the same product are much less complementary (column 4). This is because the buyer can temporarily substitute a costly input from a seller with its input inventory holdings. From column (2), we find that the level of inventory of a seller’s industry matters much less: Inputs remain highly complementary and close to our baseline estimate of 0.55 irrespective of the inventory level of the seller’s industry.

Elasticities by Product Aggregation. To examine differences across product aggregations that reflect different notions of a product, we re-estimate our main specification in Table A11 using HS-6 and HS-8 as product definitions. In columns (1) and (3), we replicate our main specifications, with elasticities of 0.43 (for HS-6) and 0.06 (for HS-8), respectively. These numbers reflect higher degrees of complementarity when we consider a more granular notion of product. This evidence is again consistent with the macro and production networks literature which generally argue that the elasticity of substitution increases with the level of aggregation (Houthakker, 1955; Bachmann et al., 2024; Lagos, 2006), as discussed in Section 5.2. Finer product classifications (e.g., HS-8) may also imply that there are fewer suppliers one may be able to source from, and so we may expect a lower elasticity of substitution between suppliers. Overall, these patterns suggest that inputs are highly specific for buying firms.

To summarize, our analysis of mechanisms highlights a few important reasons why the elasticity of substitution are so low. First, low institutional quality and high preference for relational

contracts make it costly for firms to establish new supplier contracts. This is consistent with other work in this context (Aekka and Khanna, 2024; Fujii et al., 2022). Second, we are estimating a short-run elasticity. While this is the relevant elasticity for large shocks (such as pandemic-induced lockdowns, weather shocks, conflict, disasters, and supply-chain disruptions), they likely reflect firms having a strategy to wait, and weather out the storm. Third, and related, inventory management allows firms to not switch suppliers: we find that industries where firms have higher inventory have lower elasticities of substitution.

7 QUANTIFICATION IN A STANDARD NETWORK MODEL

In what follows, we outline a simple quantitative general equilibrium model of firm-to-firm trade (Baqae and Farhi, 2019) to serve as an illustration of the influence of the elasticity of substitution across suppliers for shock propagation through firm networks. Our model is intentionally parsimonious, and only modifies standard frameworks by including the possibility that suppliers of the same product are not perfect substitutes. This simplicity allows our estimates to be used in other contexts.²⁷ The production sector is perfectly competitive.²⁸ We adapt the general nested CES structure to reflect the possibility that suppliers within the same product category could be substitutes or complements. Firms combine inputs in a CES fashion in each of its three tiers. In the first tier, firms combine labor and aggregated intermediate inputs to produce output. In the second tier, firms combine aggregated intermediate inputs of a product category. In the third tier, firms combine suppliers within a product category. The model yields estimating equations we then use to estimate the firm-level elasticity of substitution between suppliers of the same product category.

We consider a fixed set of firms \mathcal{F} and of product categories \mathcal{I} , where $N = |\mathcal{F}|$ is the total number of firms in the economy, N_i is the number of firms producing a good of product category i , and $I = |\mathcal{I}|$ is the number of product categories. Each firm produces according to its technology

$$y_{nj} = A_n \left(w_{nl} (l_n)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} + (1 - w_{nl}) (x_{nj})^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}, \quad (13)$$

where y_{nj} is the output produced by firm n in product j , A_n is the productivity of firm n , l_n is the labor used by firm n , x_{nj} is the composite intermediate input used by firm n in product category j , α is the elasticity of substitution between labor and the composite material input, and w_{nl} is the

²⁷However, this parsimony implies that the elasticity of substitution across suppliers should not be viewed as a fixed exogenous parameter but rather as one that depends on various factors, including market structure, institutional quality, firm types, and inventories. We empirically document this heterogeneity but focus primarily on the average value of the parameter throughout much of the analysis.

²⁸Paragraph “Market power, variable prices, and bargaining” in Section 5.1 contains a discussion of this assumption.

intensity of labor in production. The composite material input, in turn, consists of inputs from the I different product categories in the economy and is:

$$x_{nj} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^I w_{i,nj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} (x_{i,nj})^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}} \right)^{\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1}}, \quad (14)$$

where ζ is the firm-level elasticity of substitution across products i ,²⁹ and $w_{i,nj}$ is the importance of inputs of product category i for firm n of product j . $x_{i,nj}$ are intermediate inputs from product i going to firm n producing product j , which are constructed as:³⁰

$$x_{i,nj} = \left(\sum_{m=1}^{N_i} \mu_{m,i,nj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} x_{m,i,nj}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}, \quad (15)$$

where $x_{m,i,nj}$ are intermediate inputs from supplier m of product i sold to firm n producing product j . $\mu_{m,i,nj}$ is the unobserved importance of input from supplier m of product i in the production of firm n of product j , and ϵ is the firm-level elasticity of substitution across different suppliers within the same product category. This is the key elasticity we have estimated. The above production functions work for reproducible factors. For non-reproducible factors (in our case, labor), the production function is an endowment: $Y_f = 1$.

Product 0 represents the final consumption of the household and is given by

$$C = \left(\sum_i^N w_{0i} (c_i)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (16)$$

where $\sum_i w_{0i} = 1$ and σ is the elasticity of substitution in consumption.

7.1 Model in standard form.

To write the economy in standard form as in [Baqae and Farhi \(2020\)](#), we construct an input-output matrix $\hat{\Omega}$ with dimension $2+N+I$, where 2 dimensions come from the household's consumption aggregator, and a factor of production (labor), N dimensions come from the N firms in the economy, and I dimensions come from the I product categories in the economy. We explicitly distinguish between labor and intermediate inputs since labor is non-reproducible.

²⁹Previous work has estimated different related versions of this elasticity; e.g., elasticities of substitution across industries ([Atalay, 2017](#)), across goods from different countries ([Boehm et al., 2019](#)), or across product categories ([Carvalho et al., 2021](#); [Peter and Ruane, 2022](#)).

³⁰We exclude foreign intermediate goods since they are not exposed to Indian Covid-19 lockdown shocks.

Consider the vector of elasticities by $\hat{\theta}$, where $\hat{\theta} = (\sigma, \alpha, \zeta, \epsilon)$. Formally, a nested-CES economy in standard form is defined by the tuple $(\hat{\Omega}, \hat{\theta})$. The input-output matrix $\hat{\Omega}$ of size $(2+N+I) \times (2+N+I)$ is a matrix where element (i, j) equals the value of $\Omega_{ij} = \frac{p_j x_{ij}}{p_i y_i}$, which is the expenditure share of the i th firm on inputs from the j th supplier as a share of the total revenue of firm i . Note that every supplier is a CES aggregate. The Leontief inverse is $\psi = (1 - \Omega)^{-1}$. Intuitively, the (i, j) th element of ψ (the Leontief inverse) measures i 's total reliance on j as a supplier. That is, it captures both the direct and indirect ways i uses j in its production. Let us also denote the sales of producer i as a fraction of GDP by λ_i , where $\lambda_i = \frac{p_i y_i}{\sum_j p_j c_j}$.

The input-output covariance operator is

$$Cov_{\Omega_k}(\psi_{(i)}, \psi_{(j)}) = \sum_{l=1}^{2+N+I} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \psi_{lj} - \left(\sum_{l=1}^{2+N+I} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \right) \left(\sum_{l=1}^{2+N+I} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{lj} \right). \quad (17)$$

This operator measures the covariance between the i th and the j th columns of the Leontief inverse using the k th row of the input-output matrix as distribution. The second-order macroeconomic impact of microeconomic shocks in this economy is given by:

$$\frac{d^2 \log Y}{d \log A_j d \log A_i} = \frac{d \lambda_i}{d \log A_j} = \sum_k (\theta_k - 1) \lambda_k Cov_{\Omega_{(k)}}(\Psi_{(i)}, \Psi_{(j)}). \quad (18)$$

For a detailed derivation of Equation (18), see the appendix of [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#). To inspect how firm-level shocks can propagate through supply chains, consider the following example. Firm j , which is located in a *Red* zone, suffers a negative productivity shock, given by $d \log A_j < 0$. The second order term captures the reallocation effect: In response to a negative shock to product category j , all products k downstream of j may readjust their demand for all other inputs. Crucially, the impact of such readjustments by any given k on the output of product i depends on the size of product k as captured by its *Domar* weight λ_k , the elasticity of substitution θ_k in k 's production function, and the extent to which the supply chains that connect i and j to k coincide with one another, as given by the covariance term. Importantly, i and j in Equation 18 could be firms, and in that case, these shock propagation equations determine how shocks to individual firms (j) can propagate through the entire network depending on the sizes of the downstream sector (k) that j supplies inputs to, the number of input suppliers to the affected downstream sector k , and how these suppliers' supply chains overlap with j 's supply chain.

7.2 Quantification and counterfactuals

In this section, we use both data from our production network and our newly estimated elasticities to quantify the role of these elasticities in the propagation of shocks. To do this, we need to write down the Leontief matrix in standard form. Given the production structure of our economy, we need four submatrices: (i) firm purchases of 4-digit HS products, (ii) firm sales of 4-digit HS products, (iii) labor employed by each firm, and (iv) final sales by each firm. The first two submatrices are directly constructed from the firm-to-firm trade data from the pre-Covid-19 period of March 2019 to February 2020. Labor employed and final sales by firms are obtained by merging in firm-level data from *IndiaMART*³¹, which contains information on firm-level employment and final sales. For more details on this, see Appendix C.

The economy is comprised of $N = 93,260$ firms, $I = 1,293$ different HS-4 products, labor, and a composite final good. The average firm buys 10 distinct products as a buyer and sells 5 distinct products as a seller. The most connected buyer and seller buys and sells over 500 distinct products. We use this $94,555 \times 94,555$ input-output matrix to understand how complementarities at the firm level affect the propagation of shocks through production networks.

While recent work also quantifies the effect of firm-level shocks on aggregate GDP up to the second order, they mostly rely on changes in firm-level final sales rather than the full production network. Instead, we identify the most connected firms, deriving the Leontief inverse from the entire production network. Without relying on any approximation, we use the full network to quantify the importance of firm connectivity separately from firm size. This exponentially increases computational complexity from the order of $(N+I+2)$ to $(N+I+2)^2$. As such, we use computational innovations in big data to implement this procedure. For more details on the derivation of the shock propagation equation and its numerical implementation, see Appendix E.

Note that our quantification exercises in this section are conditional on the products that firms buy or sell being given at the extensive margin, even though a firm can change its set of buyers or suppliers (Baqae et al., 2023; Khanna et al., 2022). We, therefore, need to empirically assess whether the set of HS-4 products a buyer buys and the set of HS-4 products that a seller sells changes between the pre and post-Covid-19 period. We do this by inspecting whether both sellers and buyers of each product continued to trade in their corresponding product categories after the Covid-19 lockdowns. In Figure A6, we show the product-level distribution of the share of sellers that sold and buyers that purchased goods of that product during both periods t and $t-1$, where t is a 6-month window before and after the lockdowns. In the figure, we see that, for both sellers and buyers, these two distributions are very similar to each other. The overall stability in Figure A6

³¹See [IndiaMART \(link\)](#).

shows that the assumption that the products that firms buy or sell do not change is tenable when analyzing the impact of negative productivity shocks.

7.2.1. How important is the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers?

We assess the importance of the estimated firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers for the same product by studying how this elasticity determines the impacts of negative firm-level productivity shocks on aggregate GDP. In this counterfactual, we shock the productivity of firms located in *Red* zones by 25%. We find that this productivity shock reduces GDP by 10.95%. As an empirical benchmark, the state's annual GDP fell by 11.3% in 2020/21. This fall would be 2.68pp less in a model where firms in the same HS-4 product are considered substitutes ($\epsilon = 2$) and 0.99pp more when firms in the same HS-4 product are considered almost Leontief ($\epsilon = 0.001$). Given the quarterly GDP of this state in 2020-2021, the additional losses due to firm-level complementarities translate into 870 million USD, which is about 25 USD per capita per quarter, compared to the case when firms are substitutes.³²


Note that the differences in GDP that arise from changing the values of firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers only change the second-order effects on GDP, not the first-order. Then, how important are these second-order effects that we have estimated? In Figure 5, we simulate different levels of negative productivity shocks for four different values of the elasticity ϵ and plot the second-order percentage point change in GDP due to these shocks. The blue and red lines show these differences for high levels of complementarity between suppliers: 0.001 and our estimated elasticity 0.55, respectively. The green and yellow lines show the additional second-order change in GDP for high levels of substitution across suppliers: 1.75 and 1.25, respectively.

These plots provide two main lessons. First, for a given negative productivity shock, the second-order effects intensify with the degree of complementarity between suppliers. Second, given the same value of ϵ , the second-order effects intensify with the magnitude of the productivity shocks. Finally, as suppliers exhibit higher substitutability, the second-order effects dampen the negative first-order effects, and more so, for higher values of productivity shocks. When suppliers instead exhibit complementarity, the second-order effects magnify the negative first-order effects. That is, unlike the first-order effects, which only depend on firm size, complementarities at the firm level non-linearly amplify the effects of negative productivity shocks. This reflects similar amplification patterns that (Baqae and Farhi, 2019) document, but at the industry level. These graphs illustrate the importance of second-order effects largely driven by firm complementarities,

³²To put these numbers into perspective, Baqae and Farhi (2019) showed that complementarities at the industry level, with an elasticity of substitution 0.001, amplify the effect of a negative 13% shock in the oil industry on GDP by around 0.61%.

especially for large, short-lived, negative productivity shocks such as Covid-19.

FIGURE 5: How important are second-order effects?



Notes: The horizontal axis is the percentage change in productivity for firms in *Red* districts. The vertical axis is the second-order change in GDP in percentage points for different values of the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers (ϵ). Different values of the elasticity ($\epsilon = 0.001$, $\epsilon = 0.55$, $\epsilon = 1.25$, and 1.75) are plotted with different colors.

7.2.2. How important is a firm's connectivity in its network?


Since [Hulten \(1978\)](#), policy-makers and researchers have emphasized the importance of firm sizes in the propagation of shocks. Now, we investigate the importance of firm connectedness, given fixed firm sizes, in the propagation of shocks. We conduct these counterfactuals for different values of elasticities of substitution when suppliers are complementary, as our empirical analysis points to strong complementarities between suppliers.

In this counterfactual, we explore the importance of a firm's connectivity in its network. We measure firm connectivity by its value within the Leontief inverse matrix, which measures firms' direct and indirect connections to other firms.³³ Firm size is measured by its Domar weight.

Since firm sizes and connectivity are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.75, we vary the firms' connectivity for a given level of firm size to tease out the pure effect of connectivity. To implement this, we choose firms with Domar weights equal in size for up to 5 decimal

³³The $(i, j)^{th}$ entry of the Leontief is a measure of firm i 's total reliance on j as a supplier. Summing across all i 's yields a measure of the connectivity of each supplier j or its importance in the firm network in terms of connectivity.

FIGURE 6: Second order GDP effects when firms with the same size but different connectivity are affected



Notes: The figure comprises three panels. In each panel, the horizontal axis is the percentage change in productivity for firms in our state, and the vertical axis is the second-order change in GDP, in percentage points for different values of firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers (ϵ). Each panel corresponds to different values of the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers (ϵ). Each panel contains three scenarios. The first scenario is the blue line, where the most connected firms are shocked. The second scenario is the green line, where random firms are shocked. The third scenario is the red line, where the least connected firms are shocked.

places. The first set consists of the most connected firms, the second set is a random draw of firms, and the third set consists of the least connected firms. Since firm sizes are given, the first-order effects are the same irrespective of how connected the firms are.³⁴

In Figure 6, we only plot the second-order effects on GDP under these three experiments. In the first scenario, only the most connected firms are affected by negative productivity shocks (blue line). In the second, a random draw of firms is affected (green). Finally, in the third scenario, only

³⁴This is the only counterfactual where we draw firms from the entire state rather than only firms located in *Red* zones to maximize the number of firms that vary in connectivity for a given firm size.

the least connected firms are affected (red). We perform these experiments under three different elasticities of substitution: an elasticity of substitution amounting to near perfect complementarity ($\epsilon = 0.001$) in the left panel, our estimated complementarity ($\epsilon = 0.55$) in the right panel, and near Cobb-Douglas ($\epsilon = 0.98$) in the bottom panel. All these experiments are conditional on given firm sizes; that is, we vary the connectivity of firms after matching on firm sizes.

These counterfactuals show that the fall in GDP is much larger if the most connected firms are affected compared to the least connected firms or a random set of firms for a given firm size (Domar weight).³⁵ The importance of the most connected firms increases non-linearly with the negative productivity shocks: as the shock gets larger, it becomes increasingly important to give attention to the most connected firms. Our experiment suggests that for our baseline value of elasticity of substitution ($\epsilon = 0.55$) and a negative productivity shock of 45%, if the better-connected firms are allowed to operate, given the same firm sizes, compared to randomly targeting firms, the fall in GDP would be 0.20pp less, and 0.31pp less compared to targeting the least connected firms.

We notice three patterns: First, in the near Cobb-Douglas case ($\epsilon = 0.98$), the differences in GDP when allowing the least or the most connected firms to operate are negligible because the second-order effects are negligible. Second, as the level of productivity shock increases, it becomes more important to save the most connected firms. While for a low productivity shock of 5%, the differences in GDP are negligible (0.001pp and 0.002pp), for a productivity shock of 25%, these differences are 0.05pp and 0.07pp compared to saving randomly connected and the least connected firms. Third, the effects of these non-linearities are more pronounced when suppliers are highly complementary. For near-perfect complementarity ($\epsilon = 0.001$) and a high negative productivity shock (−45%), the gains from saving the most connected firms in an economy compared to saving randomly targeted and least connected firms are 0.38pp and 0.60pp, which is almost double the gains if instead suppliers were moderately complementary ($\epsilon = 0.55$).


7.2.3. *How important is measuring a firm’s total (direct plus indirect) connectivity?*

Existing work has shown that shocks to a firm’s suppliers affect the buyer firm and its suppliers (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2018). But shocks to a firm can affect not just its direct but also other indirect connections (Carvalho et al., 2021). In this counterfactual, we quantify how important it is to take into account a firm’s indirect connectivity in understanding how firm-level shocks affect aggregate GDP. To be precise, a firm’s indirect connections measure not only the number of direct

³⁵Relatedly, Liu and Tsyvinski (2020) show that negative shocks to upstream sectors can have more adverse effects on GDP despite having identical Domar weights. While our effects materialize from the second-order propagation through a roundabout production network with firm complementarity, the results in Liu and Tsyvinski (2020) stem from adjustment costs in a vertical production network.

buyers of a supplier but also the buyers' buyers and their buyers and so on.³⁶

FIGURE 7: How important is a firm's connectivity in its network?



Notes: The horizontal axis is the percentage change in productivity for firms in *Red* districts. The vertical axis is the second-order change in GDP in percentage points for $\epsilon = 0.55$. The blue line corresponds to the baseline case when all firms in the *Red* districts are affected. The red line corresponds to the case when the government only bails out the 10% most directly connected firms. The green line corresponds to the case when the government bails out the 10% firms with the most (direct+indirect) total connections.

We conduct two experiments. In the first, the most directly connected 10% firms in *Red* zones are allowed to operate, where direct connectivity is measured by the number of buyers a supplier directly supplies (red line in Figure 7). In the second, the most connected 10% firms in *Red* zones are allowed to operate, where the total connectivity of a firm is measured by all its direct and indirect connections (green line in Figure 7). Note that, unlike the previous counterfactual, we do not fix firm sizes. We are interested in understanding if the most directly connected firms are allowed to operate as opposed to the most connected firms, irrespective of size, and how that would affect aggregate GDP. We report the total effect on GDP under these two sets of experiments and the baseline results (shock to all firms in *Red* zones).

We find that, under our estimated elasticity of $\epsilon = 0.55$ and a negative productivity shock of 25%, the fall in GDP would be 2.56pp less if firms were allowed to operate based on total connectivity as opposed to direct connectivity. We see that as the level of the negative productivity shock increases, the difference in aggregate GDP between these two sets of experiments rises, emphasizing the importance of measuring a firm's indirect connections as well.

³⁶As a reminder, we measure the total connectivity of a firm by its value within the Leontief inverse matrix, which measures firms' direct and indirect connections to other firms.

8 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we use highly disaggregated firm-to-firm transaction-level data from a large Indian state and provide one of the first estimates of firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers within the same product category. We provide new estimation strategies and estimates for these elasticities by leveraging regional variation in supply-side shocks induced by the Indian government’s massive lockdown policy. Leveraging instrumental variables derived from lockdown policies and incorporating high-dimensional fixed effects, we estimate a novel elasticity that adds to the existing literature.

We find that in the short-run, suppliers of inputs are highly complementary even at this very granular level. This suggests that buyers are unable to replace a sufficient amount of the input from high-cost suppliers with inputs from lower-cost substitutes to lower their overall expenditure share attributed to the high-cost supplier.

We argue that this elasticity is an empirical average of elasticities of substitution that vary across types of firms, locations, and industries. We explore explanations behind this low elasticity, showing that contract specificity of inputs, the level of inventory of the buyer’s industry, and the time horizon matter. Low institutional quality and high preference for relational contracts make it costly for firms to switch suppliers, and reflect a lower elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, as we are estimating a short-run elasticity, relevant elasticity for large shocks (such as pandemic-induced lockdowns, weather shocks, conflict, disasters, and supply-chain disruptions), the elasticity likely reflects firms’ strategy of waiting out the shock. Third, and related, inventory management allows firms to not switch suppliers.

Our elasticity crucially determines aggregate impacts and the transmission of shocks across the network but is especially difficult to pin down (Baqae and Farhi, 2019). The combined advantage of having product-level unit values and quasi-experimental variation in supply-side shocks allows us to overcome previous challenges in the literature, and credibly estimate this elasticity across suppliers of a particular product.

Since inputs are complementary, adverse shocks to even a small subset of firms that are highly linked in the supply chain can negatively affect the aggregate economy by propagating through firm networks. When we conservatively shock only the productivity of firms located in *Red* zones by 25%, we find that if suppliers of the same product were substitutes instead of complements, the fall in aggregate quarterly GDP in the state under study would be about 870 million USD lower, or about 25 USD per capita lower per quarter. Using big data computational techniques, we quantify this decline *directly* using information on the economy-wide firm-to-firm network with-

out relying on first-order approximations. Our methods thus provide new techniques to quantify shocks through large and complex production networks. Using data on the entire production network in the state, we measure the full connectivity of firms in the network and show that as the level of complementarity and the magnitude of the negative productivity shock increase, it is more effective to save the more connected firms, after controlling for firm size.

Our findings have implications for policymakers worldwide, who often face difficult trade-offs in crisis regarding which firms to bail out. We highlight the importance of a firm's overall connectivity (including second and third-degree connections) by isolating the role of nodal firms in propagating shocks through production networks. Simply relying on firm size or first-degree connections is unlikely to produce the highest return targets for government aid. Given the underlying variation used, our estimates are relevant for other crises that are expected to remain short-lived, such as natural disasters, temporary trade wars and sanctions, and supply-chain disruptions.

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Appendix for online publication only

A APPENDIX TABLES

TABLE A1: Summary statistics

<i>Panel A: 2019</i>			
	Jan-March	April-June	July-September
Number of sellers	135,849	131,996	133,897
Number of buyers	193,660	188,708	189,219
Total sales (mln. rupees)	962,688	908,361	1,036,831
Number of transactions	7,772,883	7,808,325	7,934,706
<i>Panel B: 2020</i>			
	Jan-March	April-June	July-September
Number of sellers	113,121	69,171	86,696
Number of buyers	164,153	114,353	135,056
Total sales (mln. rupees)	811,755	369,645	775,478
Number of transactions	7,362,508	3,201,081	4,782,336

Notes: This table consists of two panels. Panel A contains information about the number of sellers, buyers, transactions, and total sales for the periods January-March, April-June, July-September for the year 2019. Panel B is the same as Panel A, but for 2020.

TABLE A2: Indegree summary statistics

# suppliers per industry-by-buyer-by-time	Mean	St. Dev.	P1	P50	P99
4-digit HS	6.134	16.719	1	2	60
4-digit HS, monthly	1.432	1.662	1	1	7
4-digit HS, quarterly	1.574	2.122	1	1	9
6-digit HS	5.168	12.733	1	2	45
6-digit HS, monthly	1.300	1.275	1	1	6
6-digit HS, quarterly	1.399	1.652	1	1	7
8-digit HS	5.078	10.331	1	2	40
8-digit HS, monthly	1.207	.958	1	1	4
8-digit HS, quarterly	1.266	1.073	1	1	5

Notes: This table reports number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and percentiles 1/50/99 for the number of suppliers per product-by-buyer-by-time. Each row reports these statistics by different definitions of a product (4, 6, and 8 digit HS codes) and by time frequency (atemporal, monthly, and quarterly).

TABLE A3: Outdegree summary statistics

# buyers per seller-by-time	Mean	St. Dev.	P1	P50	P99
4-digit HS	64.182	532.814	1	5	985
4-digit HS, monthly	9.211	44.908	1	2	124
4-digit HS, quarterly	12.035	63.022	1	2	169
6-digit HS	69.082	598.099	1	6	1047
6-digit HS, monthly	9.904	50.472	1	2	134
6-digit HS, quarterly	13.041	71.208	1	2	185
8-digit HS	73.293	768.552	1	5	1120
8-digit HS, monthly	11.097	66.348	1	2	151
8-digit HS, quarterly	13.893	86.029	1	2	199

Notes: This table reports number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and percentiles 1/50/99 for the number of buyers per seller-by-time. Each row reports these statistics by different definitions of a product (4, 6, and 8 digit HS codes) and by time frequency (atemporal, monthly, and quarterly).

TABLE A4: Distribution of economic activity by industry and type of transaction

HS section	Sales share	Purchase share
Animals	1.5034	0.7723
Vegetables	15.2982	11.2945
Fats	2.2934	2.6251
Processed foods	4.2172	5.5548
Minerals	13.1241	10.2353
Chemicals	9.8288	9.0791
Plastics	13.1516	9.1410
Leather	0.1618	0.1677
Wood	2.5110	1.2130
Wood derivatives	1.0783	1.3598
Textiles	3.6342	6.4576
Clothing	1.3428	0.9107
Handicrafts	1.0190	1.9337
Jewelry	1.7005	1.4980
Metal	10.4473	12.1969
Machinery	10.9909	13.5771
Transport equipment	4.7124	8.4147
Surgical instrum.	1.4478	1.6478
Arms and ammo	0.0057	0.0095
Miscellaneous	1.2263	1.4936
Art	0.3043	0.4166
Type of transaction		
Within-state	72.6822	52.2224
Inter-state	23.2183	44.5151
Foreign	4.0994	3.2623

Notes: The table consists of an upper panel and a lower panel. In the upper panel, we show the share of sales to and purchases from our Indian state of analysis by industry (HS Section). In the lower panel, we show the share of sales to and purchases from our Indian state, by whether the buyer or seller is within the state, in another state of India, or abroad. Statistics were calculated using data for 2019.

TABLE A5: 2SLS, firm-level elasticity of substitution across (at least two) suppliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.2383 (0.1206)	0.3381 (0.0627)	0.4121 (0.1236)	0.3688 (0.1146)	0.4418 (0.1982)	0.4048 (0.2223)
ϵ	0.7616	0.6618	0.5878	0.6311	0.5592	0.5952
Obs	851120	599918	599918	544819	1020362	751411
K-PF	58.989	97.958	233.084	527.534	69.827	98.916
Seller IV	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
Bilateral IV		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Feenstra term	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Buyer-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Product-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Buyer-product FE				Y		
Seller-product FE				Y		Y
Buyer-product-time FE					Y	Y

Notes: 2SLS estimates are obtained from estimating Equation (6). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. The set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they traded during both the current and previous month. We only consider the cases when a buyer traded with at least two common suppliers in a given period. The first stage uses either bilateral or seller-level instruments, as pointed out by rows six and seven. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), while seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). The first row reports the estimates associated with changes in log relative unit values. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level, and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ , which is 1 minus the estimate on the first row. The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic from the first stage. A product category is a 4-digit HS code and the treatment period is March-May 2020. The table contains six columns. Each column corresponds to different combinations of instruments, fixed effects, and whether the Feenstra is included, as pointed out by the last eight rows. All specifications include the controls mentioned in the paper.

TABLE A6: 2SLS, extensive margin: firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\log(p)$	0.7460 (0.7568)	0.1905 (0.5827)	0.2503 (2.118233)	0.7707 (0.9545)
ϵ	0.2539	0.8094	0.7496	0.2292
Obs	719375	519777	502828	502828
K-PF	56.776	118.441	27.993	24.290
Seller IV	Y	Y		Y
Bilateral IV		Y	Y	Y
Buyer-product-time FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Seller FE				Y

Notes: The first row reports 2SLS estimates from Equation (8). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. The first stage uses either bilateral or seller-level instruments, as pointed out by rows six and seven. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), while seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). The first row reports the estimates associated with changes in log unit values. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level, and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ , which is 1 minus the estimate on the first row. The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic from the first stage. A product category is a 4-digit HS code and the treatment period is March-May 2020. Rows eight and nine report whether buyer-by-product-time or seller fixed effects are included.

TABLE A7: 2SLS, firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers, by input specificity, institutional quality, and lockdown severity

	By lockdown intensity		Input specificity		Institutional quality		
	Medium	Severe	Differentiated	Homogeneous	Low	Mid	High
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.3062 (0.1367)	0.4659 (0.4478)	0.3766 (0.1139)	-0.0741 (0.2652)	0.1961 (0.1089)	0.4186 (0.3300)	0.6637 (0.1114)
ϵ	0.6938	0.5341	0.6233	1.0741	0.8038	0.5813	0.3362
Obs	1379884	1093030	1267668	457219	628824	784589	515548
K-PF	251.358	7.848	708.404	299.327	72.520	246.447	61.899

Notes: The first row reports 2SLS estimates from Equation (6). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. For the 2SLS estimates, the set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they also traded during the previous month. The first stage uses both bilateral and seller-level instruments. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), while seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level, and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ . The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports Kleibergen-Paap F statistics from the first stage. The table is comprised of seven columns. The first two columns come from Equation (12), and aim to test the validity of the CES assumption. The estimates are conditional on the lockdown severity of the seller, where *Medium* is *Orange* lockdown, and *Severe* is *Red* lockdown. The middle two columns report estimates conditional on the seller's input classified as "Differentiated" or "Homogeneous" according to Rauch (1999). The last three columns report estimates conditional on the institutional quality of buyer's location. The locations of buyers are categorized in terciles according to their institutional quality from the DevData Lab database. Districts in the first tercile of institutional quality are categorized as "Low", in the second tercile are categorized as "Medium", and districts in the third tercile of institutional quality are categorized as "High". This variable is measured as the average number of days a district's courts until the first hearing. All specifications include buyer-by-time, product-by-time, buyer-by-product, and seller-by-product fixed effects.

TABLE A8: Firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers, by HS section

Section	Name	OLS elast.	2SLS elast.
1	Animals	0.6892	0.1648
2	Vegetables	0.7799	0.7149
3	Fats	.	.
4	Processed foods	0.7125	0.1917
5	Minerals	0.8326	0.3974
6	Chemicals	0.7735	0.5828
7	Plastics	0.7179	0.9796
8	Leather	.	.
9	Wood	0.8728	0.6154
10	Wood derivatives	0.7812	0.8915
11	Textiles	0.8249	0.8103
12	Clothing	0.8232	0.3360
13	Handcrafts	0.6737	.
14	Jewelry	0.8104	1.3721
15	Metal	0.8145	0.8142
16	Machinery	0.6072	0.8691
17	Transport equipment	.	.
18	Surgical instruments	0.5954	0.3799
19	Arms and ammo	0.4140	.
20	Miscellaneous	0.6903	0.8383
21	Art	0.5514	0.1486

Notes: Each row corresponds to an industry, which is defined as an HS section. Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. The second column contains the name of the industry. The third and fourth columns report the estimated elasticities by OLS and 2SLS from Equation (6). Both OLS and 2SLS estimators include product-by-time, buyer-by-time, buyer-by-product, and seller-by-product fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both origin and destination states. All specifications include the controls mentioned in the paper. Elasticities were not reported if there was low statistical power or a weak first stage.

TABLE A9: Firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers, monthly vs. quarterly

Normal FEs				
	Monthly		Quarterly	
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.2171 (0.0133)	0.4538 (0.5461)	0.1436 (0.8564)	0.2116 (0.7883)
ϵ	0.7828	0.5461	0.8564	0.7883
Obs	2028039	2028039	1518102	1518102
K-PF	.	143.413	.	11.501
Strong FEs				
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.3062 (0.0099)	0.5238 (0.2273)	0.1924 (0.0082)	0.5326 (0.3737)
ϵ	0.6937	0.4761	0.8075	0.4673
Obs	1712307	1106739	891790	961465
K-PF	.	87.134	.	17.253

Notes: The first row report the OLS estimates from Equation (6), and 2SLS estimates from Equation (6). For the 2SLS estimates, the set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they also traded during the previous period. The first stage uses both bilateral and seller-level instruments. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), while seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). Periods are either months or quarters depending on the frequency of the data, from April 2019 to October 2020. The first two columns are monthly estimates, and the last two columns are quarterly estimates. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level, and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ . The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports Kleibergen-Paap F statistics from the first stage. “Normal FEs” include buyer-by-period and product-by-period fixed effects, while “Strong FEs” also include buyer-by-product and seller-by-product fixed effects.

TABLE A10: 2SLS, firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers, by levels of inventory

	Sellers' industry inventories		Buyers' industry inventories	
	Low	High	Low	High
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.4120 (0.1881)	0.3847 (0.4584)	0.4504 (0.1984)	-0.0800 (0.4108)
ϵ	0.5879	0.6152	0.5495	1.080026
Obs	700938	698996	319318	293203
K-PF	274.5876	161.5413	750.8763	192.9017
Mean Inventories/Sales	0.181	1.766	0.200	2.523

Notes: The first row reports 2SLS estimates from Equation (6). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. For the 2SLS estimates, the set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they also traded during the previous month. The first stage uses both bilateral and seller-level instruments. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), while seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level, and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ . The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports Kleibergen-Paap F statistics from the first stage. The first two columns report estimates conditional on seller's level of inventory, and the last two columns report estimates conditional on buyer's level of inventory. A seller or a buyer are "Low" inventory when they belong to a 4-digit HS code that reports a below-median ratio of inventories to total sales. A seller or a buyer are "High" inventory when they belong to a 4-digit HS code that reports an above-median ratio of inventories to total sales. All specifications include buyer-by-time, product-by-time, buyer-by-product, and seller-by-product fixed effects.


TABLE A11: Alternative specifications: 2SLS, firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\log\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{\bar{p}}\right)$	0.5687 (0.2086)	0.5476 (0.1818)	0.4927 (0.1894)	0.4531 (0.1778)	0.9371 (0.3856)	0.8063 (0.3305)	0.7084 (0.4308)	0.7809 (0.3307)
ϵ	0.4312	0.4523	0.5072	0.5468	0.0628	0.1936	0.2915	0.2190
Obs	879997	851483	843965	816122	1026381	993583	351397	341903
K-PF	37.629	121.309	38.680	102.746	42.335	87.990	83.737	50.489
HS digits	6	6	6	6	8	8	8	8
Seller IV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bilateral IV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Feenstra term	Y	Y			Y	Y		
Buyer-time FE	Y	Y			Y	Y		
Product-time FE	Y	Y			Y	Y		
Buyer-product FE		Y				Y		
Seller-product FE		Y		Y		Y		Y
Buyer-product-time FE								
Seller-product-time FE								

Notes: 2SLS estimates are obtained from estimating Equation (6). Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. The set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they also traded during both the current and previous month. In all specifications, the first stage uses both bilateral and seller-level instruments as pointed out in rows seven and eight. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), while seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). The first row reports the estimates associated with changes in relative unit values in logs. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination state level, and are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The third row reports the implied value for ϵ , which is 1 minus the estimate on the first row. The fourth row reports the number of observations. The fifth row reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic from the first stage. A product category is either a 6-digit or 8-digit HS code, as pointed out by the sixth row, and the treatment period is March-May 2020. The table contains eight columns. Each column corresponds to different combinations of HS codes, fixed effects, and whether the Feenstra is included, as pointed out by the last nine rows. All specifications include the controls mentioned in the paper.


B APPENDIX FIGURES

FIGURE A1: Variation over time in aggregate outcomes




Notes: This figure consists of 4 panels. In each panel, the horizontal axis is time, and the vertical axis is a different aggregate outcome. In the first panel, we show the number of sellers that reported a transaction by period. In the second panel, we show the number of buyers that reported a transaction by period. In the third panel, we show the number of transactions that were reported in a given period. In the fourth panel, we show the total sales for a given period.

FIGURE A2: Google mobility trends by lockdown zone




Notes: These plots are constructed using *Google Mobility Trends* data, which shows how visits and length of stay at different places change compared to a baseline. The baseline is the median value, for the corresponding day of the week, during January 3rd - February 6th 2020. The raw data is at the daily frequency for each district in India. We collapse the data at a weekly frequency, and at the zone level. Each panel corresponds to mobility in different places.

FIGURE A3: Residuals of $\log(\hat{p})$ on seller-by-HS-by-time fixed effects




Notes: These figures show densities of residuals from regressing $\log(\hat{p})$ on seller-by-HS-by-time fixed effects and distance regressors between sellers and buyers, by HS-digit codes. The figure on the left shows the density for values from -2 to 2 .

FIGURE A4: Distribution of links and sales across lockdown zones




Notes: This figure comprises two sets of panels. The first six figures are the first panel, and the last two figures are the second panel. For the first panel, in the three upper sub-figures, each panel plots the distribution of the share of buyers located in *Red*, *Orange*, or *Green* districts. Each sub-figure corresponds to sellers located in their corresponding color district. In the middle three sub-figures, each sub-figure plots the distribution of the share of sellers located in *Red*, *Orange*, or *Green* districts. Each sub-figure corresponds to buyers located in their corresponding color district. The time period is April 2018 - February 2020. For the lower panel, on the left sub-figure, for each HS section (horizontal axis), we plot the share of total sales of firms located in our large Indian state by the zone of selling districts. In the lower right sub-figure, for each HS section (horizontal axis), we plot the share of total purchases of firms located in our large Indian state by the zone of buying districts. The time period for this data is 2019.

FIGURE A5: Elasticities ϵ by seller's industry



Notes: The vertical axis is the OLS estimate of ϵ , and the horizontal axis is the 2SLS estimate of ϵ . Time is monthly from April 2019 to October 2020. These estimates come from estimating Equation (6). For the 2SLS estimate, the set of common suppliers of buyer b is $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* = \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$. That is, a supplier s of buyer b is considered *common* if they traded in both the current and previous month. The first stage uses both bilateral and seller-level instruments. Bilateral instruments correspond to Equation (11), and seller-level instruments correspond to Equation (10). An industry is an HS section. The size of each bubble is determined by total sales in the corresponding industry. See Table A8 for industry-specific numbers.

FIGURE A6: Change in Product Category Links, before and after lockdown



Notes: The figure has two density plots. On the left, we study sellers; on the right, buyers. In the left plot, we show the distribution of the share of sellers that sold goods to a given product category in both periods t and $t - 1$, where these periods are one year apart. In the right plot, we show the distribution of the share of buyers that purchased goods from a given product category in both periods t and $t - 1$, where these periods are one year apart. Product categories are 4-digit HS codes. The green densities are for periods before Covid-19 lockdowns, where t is between June 2019 and October 2019, and $t - 1$ is between June 2018 and October 2018. The red densities are for periods after Covid-19 lockdowns, where t is between June 2020 and October 2020, and $t - 1$ is between June 2019 and October 2019.

C DATA

Exposure variables. We construct two exposure variables at the firm level: $ED_{s,i,t}$ and $IM_{s,i,t}$. $ED_{s,i,t}$ is the exposure of firm s selling product i to global demand shocks in month t . $IM_{s,i,t}$ is the exposure of firm s selling product i to global supply shocks in month t . First, we construct these exposures by country, such that

$$ED_{s,i,x,t} = \left(\frac{Y_{s,i,x,0}}{\sum_{x'} Y_{s,i,x',0}} \right) X_{i,x,t}$$

$$IM_{s,i,m,t} = \left(\frac{Y_{s,i,m,0}}{\sum_{m'} Y_{s,i,m',0}} \right) M_{i,m,t},$$

where $Y_{s,i,x,0}$ is the value of goods of seller s of product i shipped to country x in 2018, $Y_{s,i,m,0}$ is the value of goods of seller s of product i shipped from country m in 2018, $X_{i,x,t}$ is the value of export demand from country x for product i in month t , excluding demand for Indian products, and $M_{i,m,t}$ is the value of import demand to country x for product i in month t , excluding demand for Indian products. We then construct our exposure variables as a weighted sum of these measures across countries, such that

$$ED_{s,i,t} = \sum_x ED_{s,i,x,t}$$

$$IM_{s,i,t} = \sum_m IM_{s,i,m,t}$$

Labor and sales. Our firm-to-firm dataset lacks data on the number of employees and final sales. We obtain data on the number of employees and total sales from an external dataset for a subset of our firms. We then estimate an OLS regression of both labor and final sales on observable variables in our firm-to-firm dataset, store the OLS estimates, and use them to predict labor and final sales for all firms.

We scrape data on the number of employees and total sales from the website *IndiaMART*, India's largest B2B digital platform. We scraped around 300,000-400,000 firm profiles, and then sent them to the tax authority to be matched with our firm-to-firm trade dataset. The matching procedure (conducted by the government) yielded 50,720 unique firms.

Each firm reports its number of employees and annual turnover (sales), both reported in brackets. The reported brackets for sales are: up to 50 Lakh, 50 Lakh-1 Crore, 1-2 Crore, 2-5 Crore, 5-10 Crore, 10-25 Crore, 25-50 Crore, 50-100 Crore, 100-500 Crore, 500-1,000 Crore, 1,000-5,000 Crore, 5,000-10,000 Crore, more than 10,000 Crore. First, we convert each reported

number into rupees, since sales in the trade dataset are reported in rupees.³⁷ Then, for each firm we assign the median value of its corresponding sales bracket. For the last bracket, we consider the upper bound to be 100,000 Crore. The reported brackets for labor are: up to 10 employees, 11-25, 26-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-1000, 1001-2000, 2001-5000, and more than 5000 employees. For each firm, we assign the median value of its corresponding labor bracket. For the last bracket, we consider the upper bound to be 50,000 employees.

We then estimate the following OLS regressions:

$$\begin{aligned}\log(labor_n) &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log(sales_n) + \alpha_2 \log(distance_n) + \epsilon_i^l \\ \log(final_n) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(sales_n) + \beta_2 \log(distance_n) + \epsilon_i^f,\end{aligned}$$

where $sales_n$ are total sales of intermediates of firm n , $distance_n$ is the average distance in kilometers of all firms' registered transactions, $labor_n$ is the number of employees constructed as previously explained, and $final_n$ is final sales. We constructed final sales by subtracting total intermediate sales from total sales, where we construct the former directly from our firm-to-firm dataset. In almost all cases, this difference was positive, which reassures that IndiaMART indeed reports total sales. Whenever the differences were negative, we input a value of 0, which implies that all firm's sales are of intermediates.

We obtain the following estimated elasticities: $(\hat{\alpha}_0, \hat{\alpha}_1, \hat{\alpha}_2) = (-2.1138, 0.2502, 0.2853)$, and $(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_2) = (9.8848, 0.3665, 0.4227)$. They are significant at the 1% confidence level. We then use these estimates to predict labor and final sales to all firms in our dataset.

Dijkstra algorithm We now list the steps of the Dijkstra algorithm we used to construct our seller-buyer-level instruments. We obtained a set of *shapefiles* of district administrative boundaries for India according to India's 2011 census. We reprojected the shapefiles into an *Asian/South Equidistance Conic* projection, which is the projection that best preserves the distance measurements. Once shapefiles are reprojected, the objective is to construct a transportation network between Indian districts.

First, we obtain the centroid of each district in India. Then, we construct a network structure according to the set of centroids. There are many ways to construct a network, so we need to take a stance on how to form the connections between centroids. For each centroid, we generate connections to the k closest centroids according to Euclidean distances.³⁸ We follow [Fajgelbaum](#)

³⁷100,000 rupees = 1 Lakh; and 10,000,000 rupees = 1 Crore.

³⁸Consider the set of nodes Φ , where $K \equiv |\Phi|$ is the number of nodes. The number of connections per node k could range from 0 up to K , where each represents extreme cases of network formation. $k = 0$ is a network without connections, so it is not possible to run a Dijkstra algorithm since it is not possible to go from one node to another.

and Schaal (2020) and consider $k = 8$ such that we consider the main cardinal directions (i.e. north, south, east, west, north-east, south-east, north-west, south-west).

We now run the Dijkstra algorithm. For all district pairs, the algorithm provides us with the list of all districts that comprise the route between the district pair, and the distance of each leg that comprise the route. Using the names of the districts, we use the lockdown data to assign a lockdown color to each district along the route, and obtain our seller-buyer-level instruments. Our first instrument is the share of districts in a route that are *Red*, *Orange*, or *Green*. When calculating these shares, we rule out the zone where the buyer resides so we do not consider demand-side shocks in our instrument. Using the distance of each leg, our second instrument is the share of meters of the route that are *Red*, *Orange*, or *Green*. We consider a leg to be of color $x = \text{Red, Orange, Green}$ whenever the origin district was of color x . In this case, we also ignore the color of the district where the buyer resides.

D DERIVATIONS

D.1 Estimation of firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers

In this section, we describe the steps to derive the firm-level elasticity of substitution across suppliers for the same product. First, we describe the model and the equations we take to the data. Second, explain how we construct price indices we need to estimate this elasticity. Third, we describe how we account for the entry and exit of suppliers for the estimation. Finally, we explain how we construct the seller-level and seller-buyer-level instruments we use to causally estimate our elasticity.

$k = K$ is a fully-connected network, where all nodes are connected with each other. Running a Dijkstra algorithm on this scenario is trivial since the shortest distance between any pair of nodes is their connection itself. Therefore, a feasible number of connections per node must be $k \in (0, K)$.

D.1.1. Expression to estimate firm-level elasticities of substitution across suppliers

A firm b selling product $j \in F$ maximizes profits subject to its technology and to a CES bundle of intermediate inputs:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & p_{bj}y_{bj} - w_{bj}l_{bj} - \sum_i \sum_s p_{si,bj}x_{si,bj} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & y_{bj} = A_b \left(w_{bl} (l_{bj})^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} + (1-w_{bl}) (x_{bj})^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}, \\ & x_{bj} = \left(\sum_i w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}} \right)^{\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1}}, \\ & x_{i,bj} = \left(\sum_s \mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} x_{si,bj}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \end{aligned}$$

The first order condition with respect to $x_{si,bj}$ is

$$\begin{aligned} [x_{si,bj}] : & p_{bj} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} \right) y_{bj} (\Theta_{bj}^1)^{-1} (1-w_{bl}) \left(\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} \right) x_{bj}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}-1} \\ & \left(\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1} \right) x_{bj} (\Theta_{bj}^2)^{-1} w_{i,j} \left(\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1} \right) x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}-1} \\ & \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1} \right) x_{i,bj} (\Theta_{i,bj}^3)^{-1} \mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \left(\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon} \right) x_{si,bj}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}-1} = p_{si,bj}, \\ & = p_{bj} y_{bj} (\Theta_{bj}^1)^{-1} (1-w_{bl}) x_{bj}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \\ & (\Theta_{bj}^2)^{-1} w_{i,j} x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}} \\ & (\Theta_{i,bj}^3)^{-1} \mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} x_{si,bj}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} = p_{si,bj}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\{\Theta_{bj}^1, \Theta_{bj}^2, \Theta_{i,bj}^3\}$ are composite terms that cancel out in the next steps. Now, consider the first order conditions with respect to $x_{si,bj}$ and $x_{s'i,bj}$ and divide them, such that

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} x_{si,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}}}{\mu_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} x_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}}} &= \frac{p_{si,bj}}{p_{s'i,bj}}, \\
\frac{x_{si,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}} p_{si,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{x_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}} p_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}} &= \frac{p_{si,bj}^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}}}{p_{s'i,bj}^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \mu_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}}}, \\
(x_{si,bj} p_{si,bj})^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \left(p_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \mu_{s'i,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}} \right) &= p_{si,bj}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{-1}{\epsilon}} (x_{s'i,bj} p_{si,bj})^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}}, \\
(x_{si,bj} p_{si,bj}) (p_{s'i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{s'i,bj}) &= p_{si,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{si,bj} (x_{s'i,bj} p_{si,bj}), \\
(PM_{si,bj}) (p_{s'i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{s'i,bj}) &= p_{si,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{si,bj} (PM_{s'i,bj}), \\
(PM_{si,bj}) \sum_{s'} (p_{s'i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{s'i,bj}) &= p_{si,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{si,bj} \sum_{s'} (PM_{s'i,bj}), \\
(PM_{si,bj}) p_{i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} &= p_{si,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{si,bj} PM_{i,bj}, \\
\frac{PM_{si,bj}}{PM_{i,bj}} &= \left(\frac{p_{si,bj}}{p_{i,bj}} \mu_{si,bj}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \right)^{1-\epsilon}, \\
\log \left(\frac{PM_{si,bj}}{PM_{i,bj}} \right) &= (1-\epsilon) \log \left(\frac{p_{si,bj}}{p_{i,bj}} \right) + \log (\mu_{si,bj}),
\end{aligned}$$

where $PM_{si,bj} \equiv p_{si,bj} x_{si,bj}$, $p_{i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \equiv \sum_{s'} p_{s'i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{s'i,bj}$, and $PM_{i,bj} \equiv \sum_{s'} PM_{s'i,bj}$. This is the derivation of Equation (3).

D.1.2. Constructing price indices

In this section, we derive the expressions that allow us to construct price indexes based on observable data. First, go back to the derivation in Appendix D.1, where

$$(PM_{si,bj}) p_{i,bj}^{1-\epsilon} = p_{si,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{si,bj} PM_{i,bj}.$$

In the data, we observe prices and expenditures over time, so we introduce a time dimension such that

$$(PM_{si,bj,t}) p_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} = p_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \mu_{si,bj,t} PM_{i,bj,t},$$

where t is a month. We can now express this equation in changes, such that

$$(\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}) \widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} = \widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t} \widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t},$$

where $\hat{x}_t \equiv \frac{x_t}{x_{t-1}}$. Our objective is for $\hat{p}_{i,bj,t}$ not to depend on $\hat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}$, which are not observable. To do this, we rely on Redding and Weinstein (2020). The key assumption is that the overall importance of a product category in a buyer's input use is time-invariant. Concretely, the geometric mean of $\mu_{si,bj,t}$ across common sellers is constant. From the maximization problem of the firm, we obtain the following expression for the CES price index at the buyer level:

$$p_{i,bj,t} = \left(\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}} \mu_{si,bj,t} p_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}},$$

where $\Omega_{i,bj,t}$ is the set of all sellers that provided to buyer b in time t . We apply Shephard's Lemma to this CES price function, which in turn yields an expression for expenditure share:

$$s_{si,bj,t} = \frac{\mu_{si,bj,t} p_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon}}{p_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon}},$$

where $s_{si,bj,t} \equiv \frac{PM_{si,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}} PM_{si,bj,t}}$. We can then rewrite this expression such that

$$p_{i,bj,t} = p_{si,bj,t} \left(\frac{\mu_{si,bj,t}}{s_{si,bj,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}, \forall s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}.$$

This expression in changes is

$$\hat{p}_{i,bj,t} = \hat{p}_{si,bj,t} \left(\frac{\hat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}}{\hat{s}_{si,bj,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}.$$

Now, common suppliers for a buyer b in time t is the set of suppliers $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^*$ that sold to buyer b in the current and previous period (i.e. $\Omega_{i,bj,t}^* \equiv \Omega_{i,bj,t} \cap \Omega_{i,bj,t-1}$), where $N_{i,bj,t}^* \equiv |\Omega_{i,bj,t}^*|$ is the number of common sellers for buyer b in time t . We now apply a geometric mean to this expression, such that

$$\begin{aligned}
\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} &= \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \left\{ \widehat{p}_{si,bj,t} \left(\frac{\widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \right\}, \\
\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} &= \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{p}_{si,bj,t} \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}}, \\
\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t} &= \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} \left(\prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \left(\widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}}, \\
\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t} &= \widehat{\widetilde{p}}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{\widetilde{s}}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \left(\prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}.
\end{aligned}$$

We now formally state the assumption we require to move forward, which is

$$\widetilde{\mu}_{i,bj,t} = \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \mu_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} = \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \mu_{si,bj,t-1}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} = \widetilde{\mu}_{i,bj,t-1}.$$

Then, the last term of our expression is

$$\begin{aligned}
\prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}} &= \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \left(\frac{\mu_{si,bj,t}}{\mu_{si,bj,t-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}, \\
&= \frac{\prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \mu_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}}{\prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \mu_{si,bj,t-1}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}}, \\
&= \frac{\widetilde{\mu}_{i,bj,t}}{\widetilde{\mu}_{i,bj,t-1}}, \\
&= 1.
\end{aligned}$$

So our final expression boils down to

$$\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} = \frac{\widehat{\widetilde{p}}_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon}}{\widehat{\widetilde{s}}_{i,bj,t}},$$

where $\widetilde{p}_{i,bj,t} \equiv \prod_s p_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}$ is a geometric mean of unit values across common suppliers, and $\widetilde{s}_{i,bj,t} \equiv$

$\prod_s \frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}$ is a geometric mean of expenditure shares across common suppliers. Notice that we have reached to our objective, since now $\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}$ is independent of $\mu_{si,bj,t}$. Finally, the expression we take to the data is

$$\begin{aligned}
\left(\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}\right) \widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} &= \widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t} \widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}, \\
\left(\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}\right) \widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \widehat{s}_{i,bj,t} &= \widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t} \widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}, \\
\frac{\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}} &= \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}\right)^{1-\epsilon} \left(\widehat{s}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}\right), \\
\log\left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}}\right) &= (1-\epsilon) \log\left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}\right) + \log\left(\widehat{s}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}\right), \\
\log\left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}}\right) &= (1-\epsilon) \log\left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}\right) + \log\left(\widehat{s}_{i,bj,t}\right) + \log\left(\widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

D.1.3. Addressing the entry and exit of suppliers

In this section, we explain how we address the fact that seller and buyer matches do not happen in every period (i.e. entry and exit of sellers). The concern is that not taking into account the fact that sellers and buyers do not trade in every period could induce a bias in the estimation of ϵ . We address this by including a correction term by [Feenstra \(1994\)](#) in our regressions. First, notice we can write down the expenditure share as

$$s_{si,bj,t} \equiv \lambda_{i,bj,t} s_{si,bj,t}^*,$$

where $\lambda_{i,bj,t}$ is the *Feenstra* correction term, and $s_{si,bj,t}^*$ is the expenditure share with respect to total expenditure on common suppliers. Notice that these terms are constructed as

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{si,bj,t} &\equiv \frac{PM_{si,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}} PM_{si,bj,t}}, \\
\lambda_{i,bj,t} &\equiv \frac{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}^*} PM_{si,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}} PM_{si,bj,t}}, \\
s_{si,bj,t}^* &\equiv \frac{PM_{si,bj,t}}{\sum_{s \in \Omega_{i,bj,t}^*} PM_{si,bj,t}}.
\end{aligned}$$

In changes, the expression for expenditure shares is

$$\widehat{s}_{si,bj,t} = \widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}^*$$

Then, the geometric mean for expenditure shares is

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\widetilde{s}}_{i,bj,t} &= \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}, \\ &= \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \left(\widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}^* \right)^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}, \\ &= \widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \prod_{s=1}^{N_{i,bj,t}^*} \left(\widehat{s}_{si,bj,t}^* \right)^{\frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}^*}}, \\ &= \widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{\widetilde{s}}_{i,bj,t}^*. \end{aligned}$$

So the final expression we take to the data is

$$\begin{aligned} \log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}} \right) &= (1 - \epsilon) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\widetilde{s}}_{i,bj,t} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t} \right), \\ &= (1 - \epsilon) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{s}_{i,bj,t}^* \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t} \right), \\ &= (1 - \epsilon) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\lambda}_{i,bj,t} \right) + \log \left(\widehat{s}_{i,bj,t}^* \right) + \log \left(\widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t} \right). \end{aligned}$$

D.1.4. Addressing endogeneity concerns

The equation from the previous section is what we take to the data. Nevertheless, there are further endogeneity issues that would contaminate our estimates for ϵ . In particular, Covid-19 lockdowns could have also induced changes in demand, which in turn would bias our estimates. For example, if Covid-19 shocks also induce negative demand shocks, our estimates would then be biased upwards. In this section, we derive our instruments. First, we consider non-arbitrage in shipping, so prices at the origin and destination between sellers and suppliers are related as

$$p_{si,bj,t} = p_{si,t} \tau_{sb,t},$$

where $p_{si,t}$ is the marginal cost (MC) of production of good i for seller s in month t , $\tau_{sb,t}$ is the

iceberg cost of transporting the good from seller s to buyer b in month t . Now, we can then express this in changes, such that

$$\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t} = \widehat{p}_{si,t} \widehat{\tau}_{sb,t}.$$

In logarithms, we have

$$\log(\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}) = \log(\widehat{p}_{si,t}) + \log(\widehat{\tau}_{sb,t}).$$

These two components of price imply two instruments. First, our seller-level instrument uses variation in MC at the seller-product level due to lockdown measures at the seller's district. To isolate variation in marginal costs driven by seller's lockdown zone, we interact the lockdown indicator ($Lock_t$) which takes the value 1 between March and May with indicator variables Red_{o_s} and $Orange_{o_s}$ that equal 1 whenever seller s was located in a district o that was either *Red* or *Orange* during the lockdown. Then, our excluded instruments are

$$\log(\widehat{p}_{si,t}) = \beta^{R,p} Red_{o(s)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,p} Orange_{o(s)} Lock_t + \nu_{si,t}^p.$$

Now we explain how we construct the instrument at the seller-buyer level. We have to take a stance about the functional form of the trade cost $\tau_{sb,t}$. We assume that trade costs are proportional to the travel time of the transportation of intermediate inputs, such that

$$\tau_{sb,t} = TravelTime_{sb,t}^\sigma.$$

If we express this in changes, we get

$$\widehat{\tau}_{sb,t} = \widehat{TravelTime}_{sb,t}^\sigma.$$

We exploit variation from the Covid-19 lockdown, which induced exogenous variation in the travel time between location pairs of sellers and buyers. Given this, we assume the following difference-in-differences setup for travel time:

$$\log(\widehat{TravelTime}_{sb,t}) = \beta^{R,T} Red_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,T} Orange_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \nu_{sb,t}^T,$$

where $Red_{o(s)d(b)}$ and $Orange_{o(s)d(b)}$ are the share of the number of districts or of distance designated as *Red* and *Orange*, respectively, along the route between seller s and buyer b . We constructed these variables using Dijkstra algorithms. Further details about this are in Appendix C. Combining the expression for changes in travel time due to the lockdown and trade costs, we get the following

expression for our seller-buyer-level excluded instruments

$$\log(\widehat{\tau}_{sb,t}) = \beta^{R,\tau} Red_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,\tau} Orange_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \nu_{sb,t}^\tau,$$

where $\beta^{R,\tau} \equiv \sigma \beta^{R,T}$, $\beta^{O,\tau} \equiv \sigma \beta^{O,T}$, and $\nu_{si,bj,t}^\tau \equiv \sigma \nu_{si,bj,t}^T$. Together, all excluded instruments are such that

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}) = & \beta^{R,p} Red_{o(s)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,p} Orange_{o(s)} Lock_t + \\ & \beta^{R,\tau} Red_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \beta^{O,\tau} Orange_{o(s)d(b)} Lock_t + \nu_{si,bj,t}^\tau, \end{aligned}$$

where $\nu_{si,bj,t} \equiv \nu_{si,t}^p + \nu_{sb,t}^\tau$.

D.2 Estimation of firm-level elasticities of substitution across products

In this section, we describe the steps to derive the firm-level elasticity of substitution across products. First, we describe the model and the equations we take to the data. Second, we describe how we construct price indices we need to estimate this elasticity. Finally, we describe the instrument we use to causally estimate our elasticity.

D.2.1. Expressions to estimate firm-level elasticities of substitution across products

We rewrite the initial maximization problem, so

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & p_{bj} y_{bj} - w_{bj} l_{bj} - \sum_i p_{i,bj} x_{i,bj} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & y_{bj} = A_b \left(w_{bl} (l_{bj})^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} + (1-w_{bl}) (x_{bj})^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}, \\ & x_{bj} = \left(\sum_i^I w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}} \right)^{\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1}}, \\ & p_{i,bj} = \left(\sum_s \mu_{si,bj} p_{si,bj}^{1-\epsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \end{aligned}$$

The first order condition with respect to $x_{i,bj}$ is

$$\begin{aligned}
[x_{i,bj}] : p_{bj} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1} \right) y_{bj} (\Theta_{bj}^4)^{-1} (1-w_{bl}) \left(\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha} \right) x_{bj}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}-1} \\
\left(\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1} \right) x_{bj} (\Theta_{bj}^5)^{-1} w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} \left(\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1} \right) x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}-1} = p_{i,bj}, p_{i,bj} \\
= p_{bj} y_{bj} (\Theta_{bj}^4)^{-1} (1-w_{bl}) x_{bj}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \\
(\Theta_{bj}^5)^{-1} w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}},
\end{aligned}$$

where $\{\Theta_{bj}^4, \Theta_{bj}^5\}$ are composite terms that cancel out in the next steps. Now, consider the same first-order conditions with respect to $x_{i',bj}$ and divide them, such that

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}}}{w_{i',bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i',bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}}} &= \frac{p_{i,bj}}{p_{i',bj}}, \\
\frac{w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i,bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}} p_{i,bj}^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}}{w_{i',bj}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} x_{i',bj}^{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}} p_{i',bj}^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}} &= \frac{p_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}}{p_{i',bj} p_{i',bj}^{-\frac{1}{\zeta}}}, \\
\frac{w_{i',bj} (x_{i,bj} p_{i,bj})}{w_{i,bj} (x_{i',bj} p_{i',bj})} &= \frac{p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta}}{p_{i',bj}^{1-\zeta}}, \\
PM_{i,bj} \left(w_{i',bj} p_{i',bj}^{1-\zeta} \right) &= PM_{i',bj} \left(w_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta} \right), \\
\sum_{i'} PM_{i,bj} \left(w_{i',bj} p_{i',bj}^{1-\zeta} \right) &= \sum_{i'} PM_{i',bj} \left(w_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta} \right), \\
PM_{i,bj} \sum_{i'} w_{i',bj} p_{i',bj}^{1-\zeta} &= w_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta} \sum_{i'} PM_{i',bj}, \\
PM_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta} &= w_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta} PM_{bj}, \\
\frac{PM_{i,bj}}{PM_{bj}} &= \frac{w_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta}}{p_{bj}^{1-\zeta}}, \\
\frac{PM_{i,bj}}{PM_{bj}} &= \left(w_{i,bj}^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}} \frac{p_{i,bj}}{p_{bj}} \right)^{1-\zeta}, \\
\log \left(\frac{PM_{i,bj}}{PM_{bj}} \right) &= (1-\zeta) \log \left(\frac{p_{i,bj}}{p_{bj}} \right) + \log (w_{i,bj}),
\end{aligned}$$

where $PM_{bj} \equiv \sum_i PM_{i,bj}$, and $p_{bj} = \left(\sum_i w_{i,bj} p_{i,bj}^{1-\zeta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}$. As we did for the estimation of the elasticity

of substitution across suppliers, we introduce a time dimension, apply Shephard's lemma to this CES price function, and also assume that the overall importance of the composite intermediates is time-invariant, so

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{i,bj,t} &= \frac{w_{i,bj,t} p_{i,bj,t}^{1-\zeta}}{p_{bj,t}^{1-\zeta}}, \\
p_{bj,t} &= p_{i,bj,t} \left(\frac{w_{i,bj,t}}{s_{i,bj,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t} &= \hat{p}_{i,bj,t} \left(\frac{\hat{w}_{i,bj,t}}{\hat{s}_{i,bj,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t}^{N_{bj,t}} &= \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{p}_{i,bj,t} \left(\frac{\hat{w}_{i,bj,t}}{\hat{s}_{i,bj,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t}^{N_{bj,t}} &= \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{p}_{i,bj,t} \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{w}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}} \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{s}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{\zeta-1}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t} &= \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{w}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \hat{s}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\zeta-1}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t} &= \hat{p}_{bj,t} \hat{w}_{bj,t}^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}} \hat{s}_{bj,t}^{\frac{1}{\zeta-1}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t} &= \hat{p}_{bj,t} \hat{s}_{bj,t}^{\frac{1}{\zeta-1}}, \\
\hat{p}_{bj,t} &= \frac{\hat{p}_{bj,t}}{\hat{s}_{bj,t}^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}},
\end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{p}_{bj,t} \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \tilde{p}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}}$ is the geometric mean of unit values across product categories that buyer b sources from, and $\tilde{s}_{bj,t} \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{N_{bj,t}} \tilde{s}_{i,bj,t}^{\frac{1}{N_{bj,t}}}$ is the geometric mean of expenditure shares across products. Now, if we also introduce a time dimension into our estimating equation, express it in changes, and consider our expression for unit values, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
PM_{i,bj,t} p_{bj,t}^{1-\zeta} &= w_{i,bj,t} p_{i,bj,t}^{1-\zeta} PM_{bj,t}, \\
\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{p}_{bj,t}^{1-\zeta} &= \widehat{w}_{i,bj,t} \widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}^{1-\zeta} \widehat{PM}_{bj,t}, \\
\log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{bj,t}} \right) &= (1-\zeta) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}{\widehat{p}_{bj,t}} \right) + \log (\widehat{w}_{i,bj,t}), \\
\log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{bj,t}} \right) &= (1-\zeta) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}{\widehat{\frac{p_{bj,t}}{\widehat{s}_{bj,t}^{1-\zeta}}}} \right) + \log (\widehat{w}_{i,bj,t}), \\
\log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{bj,t}} \right) &= (1-\zeta) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}{\widehat{\widehat{p}_{bj,t}}} \right) + \log (\widehat{\widehat{s}_{bj,t}}) + \log (\widehat{w}_{i,bj,t}).
\end{aligned}$$

D.2.2. Constructing price index $p_{i,bj,t}$

To estimate ζ , we need values for $p_{i,bj,t}$, which are not directly observed in the data since $p_{i,bj,t} \equiv (\sum_s \mu_{si,bj,t} p_{si,bj,t}^{1-\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$, which is a function of ϵ and $\mu_{si,bj,t}$. For ϵ , we consider $\epsilon = \widehat{\epsilon}$, where $\widehat{\epsilon}$ is our estimated elasticity. For $\mu_{si,bj,t}$, we use the fact that the residuals when estimating ϵ are a function of these shocks. Recall that

$$\log \left(\frac{\widehat{PM}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{PM}_{i,bj,t}} \right) = (1-\epsilon) \log \left(\frac{\widehat{p}_{si,bj,t}}{\widehat{\widehat{p}_{i,bj,t}}} \right) + X\beta + \phi_{si,bj,t},$$

where $\phi_{si,bj,t} = \log (\widehat{\mu}_{si,bj,t}) = \log \left(\frac{\mu_{si,bj,t}}{\mu_{si,bj,t-1}} \right) = \log (\mu_{si,bj,t}) - \log (\mu_{si,bj,t-1})$ are the residuals of this estimating equation. By assumption, $\log (\mu_{si,bj,t})$ are i.i.d and normally distributed shocks with mean μ and variance σ^2 , so the mean and variance of $\log (\mu_{si,bj,t}) - \log (\mu_{si,bj,t-1})$ is 0 and $2\sigma^2$, respectively. We now construct $p_{i,bj,t}$ by the following steps:

1. Estimate the 2SLS regression to obtain the estimate $\widehat{\epsilon}$;
2. Recover predicted values for the error term $\widehat{\phi}_{si,bj,t}$;
3. Calculate the empirical mean and variance of $\widehat{\phi}_{si,bj,t} : \{\widehat{\mu}_\phi, \widehat{\sigma}_\phi^2\}$;
4. Recover the values for mean and variance of $\log (\mu_{si,bj,t})$, such that: (i) $\mu = \widehat{\mu}_\phi$ and $\sigma^2 = \frac{\widehat{\sigma}_\phi^2}{2}$;
5. Make a random draw for $\log (\mu_{si,bj,t})$, which is drawn from a normal distribution with mean $\widehat{\mu}_\phi$ and variance $\frac{\widehat{\sigma}_\phi^2}{2}$;

6. For a given $\mu_{si,bj,0}$, recover $\mu_{si,bj,t}$ according to the following law of motion:

$$\begin{aligned}\log\left(\frac{\mu_{si,bj,t}}{\mu_{si,bj,t-1}}\right) &= \widehat{\phi}_{si,bj,t}, \\ \frac{\mu_{si,bj,t}}{\mu_{si,bj,t-1}} &= \exp\left(\widehat{\phi}_{si,bj,t}\right), \\ \mu_{si,bj,t} &= \exp\left(\widehat{\phi}_{si,bj,t}\right) \mu_{si,bj,t-1};\end{aligned}$$

7. We then construct unit values by

$$p_{i,bj,t} \equiv \left(\sum_s \mu_{si,bj,t} p_{si,bj,t}^{1-\widehat{\epsilon}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\widehat{\epsilon}}}$$

D.2.3. Constructing instruments

To obtain an exogenous shifter of relative unit values, which we use to obtain an unbiased estimate of ζ , we rely on the instruments we use to estimate ϵ . Consider the set of instruments $Z_{si,bj,t}$. Then, we consider the new set of instruments:

$$W_{i,bj,t} = \overline{Z}_{si,bj,t} = \frac{1}{N_{i,bj,t}} \sum_s Z_{si,bj,t}.$$

Consider the instrument that varies across both the color zone of the seller and the buyer (i.e. the share of districts in the *Red* zones within the route between the location of the seller and of the buyer). Then, the new instrument is the simple average of these shares across sellers. Intuitively, a higher share of districts in the *Red* zone should help predict a larger positive shock on unit values.

E SIMULATIONS USING QUANTITATIVE MODEL

E.1 Deriving expression for shock propagation through GDP

In this section, we discuss the details of the simulation using the quantitative model. First, recall the notations used in the paper. N is the number of firms, and I is the number of product categories. λ_k is the *Domar* weight of firm or sector k . θ_k is the elasticity of substitution corresponding to the k^{th} reproducible sector. Ω_{li} is the $(l, i)^{th}$ element of the $(N+I+2)$ input output matrix Ω , which captures the direct reliance of l on i as a supplier. ψ_{li} is the $(l, i)^{th}$ element of the $(N+I+2)$ Leontief inverse matrix $\psi \equiv (1 - \Omega)^{-1}$, which captures the direct and indirect reliance of l on i as a supplier.

The aggregate change in GDP ($\Delta \log y$) in response to changes in productivity of firm j ($\Delta \log A_j$) up to a second order is given by the following:

$$\Delta \log y = \sum_{j=1}^N \frac{\partial \log y}{\partial \log A_j} (\Delta \log A_j) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1, i \neq j}^N \frac{\partial^2 \log y}{\partial \log A_i \partial \log A_j} (\Delta \log A_i) (\Delta \log A_j) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{\partial^2 \log y}{\partial \log A_i^2} (\Delta \log A_i)^2. \quad (19)$$

Following [Baqee and Farhi \(2019\)](#), after replacing second order terms, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} &= \sum_{j=1}^N \lambda_j (\Delta \log A_j) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1, i \neq j}^N \left(\sum_{k=0}^N (\theta_k - 1) \lambda_k \text{Cov}_{\Omega(k)}(\psi_{(i)}, \psi_{(j)}) \right) (\Delta \log A_i) (\Delta \log A_j) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\sum_{k=0}^N (\theta_k - 1) \lambda_k \text{Var}_{\Omega(k)} \psi_{(i)} \right) (\Delta \log A_i)^2 \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^N \lambda_j (\Delta \log A_j) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1, i \neq j}^N \left(\sum_{k=0}^N (\theta_k - 1) \lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^{N+F} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \psi_{lj} \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - \left(\sum_{l=1}^{N+F} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \right) \left(\sum_{l=1}^{N+F} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{lj} \right) \right) (\Delta \log A_i) (\Delta \log A_j) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\sum_{k=0}^N (\theta_k - 1) \lambda_k \left(\sum_{l=1}^{N+F} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \psi_{li} \right) - \left(\sum_{l=1}^{N+F} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \right) \left(\sum_{l=1}^{N+F} \Omega_{kl} \psi_{li} \right) \right) (\Delta \log A_i)^2 \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^N \lambda_j (\Delta \log A_j) + \frac{1}{2} B + \frac{1}{2} C. \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

We now write down the expressions for terms B and C in matrix form to evaluate second-order effects. In terms of notation, $J_{m,n}$ is a matrix of ones of size m by n , \times is matrix multiplication, and \cdot is element-by-element matrix multiplication.

Term B. This term primarily captures the second-order effects on GDP that operates through changes in firm i 's *Domar* weight in response to productivity shocks to firm j , where $j \in N, j \neq i$.

We construct this term in matrix form by sequentially deriving the following matrices:

$$\begin{aligned}
M &= \psi \cdot (\Delta \log A)^T, \\
N &= J_{(N+I+2, N+I+2)} \cdot \left(J_{(N+I+2, 1)} \times \left(\psi \cdot (\Delta \log A)^T \right) \right) - \left(\psi \cdot (\Delta \log A)^T \right), \\
Covar1 &= \Omega \times (M \cdot N), \\
Covar21 &= \Omega \times M, \\
Covar22 &= \Omega \times N, \\
Covar2 &= Covar21 \cdot Covar22, \\
B &= \left((\theta - 1) \cdot \lambda \right) \times \left(Covar1 - Covar2 \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Term C. This term primarily captures the second-order effects on GDP that operates through changes in firm i 's *Domar* weight in response to productivity shocks to firm i itself. In matrix form, this term is

$$C = \left(\left((\theta - 1) \cdot \lambda \right) \times \left(\Omega \times (\psi \cdot \psi) - (\Omega \times \psi) \cdot (\Omega \times \psi) \right) \right) \times \left(\Delta \log A \cdot \Delta \log A \right).$$

GDP change in matrix form. In matrix form, we can rewrite Equation (19) as

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta \log y &= \lambda \times \Delta \log A + .5 \left((\theta - 1) \cdot \lambda \right) \times \left(Covar1 - Covar2 \right) + \\
&\quad .5 \left(\left((\theta - 1) \cdot \lambda \right) \times \left(\Omega \times (\psi \cdot \psi) - (\Omega \times \psi) \cdot (\Omega \times \psi) \right) \right) \times \left(\Delta \log A \cdot \Delta \log A \right) \quad (21)
\end{aligned}$$

E.2 Numerical implementation in Python

Numerical implementations of our simulations are challenging due to the sheer size of the firm-to-firm trade network. We have data on 93,260 firms across 1293 product categories. This generates a 94,555 by 94,555 input-output matrix. The elements inside the input-output matrix are small as the fraction of a product's output to a single firm is small and, in turn, each product category sources from a large number of suppliers. To maintain calculations as precise as possible, we used *float64* variable types within these matrices. Nevertheless, this also drastically increased the amount of computer memory required to hold matrices. For instance, the Leontief inverse matrix required more than 66GB of storage/memory size.

These large matrices require many steps to perform matrix multiplication operations on them. In computer science, matrix multiplication is one of the most demanding operations in terms of computing resources. We break down these operations by leveraging state-of-the-art computing techniques in big data. These techniques provide us with scalability when applying them to arbitrarily large input-output matrices. As detailed firm-to-firm transaction data are becoming more widely available, these techniques are promising to advance the literature on quantifying the propagation of shocks through firm networks. We now briefly describe these techniques.

First, we fit datasets larger than RAM using Dask, which is a Python library with multi-core, distributed, and parallel execution on larger-than-memory datasets.³⁹ We use Dask's distributed capabilities to parallelize our calculations when computing second-order effects which require few matrix multiplication operations on large 94,555 by 94,555 matrices.

Second, we use a computer powered by multiple GPUs. GPUs are essential for performing a large number of matrix multiplications. For example, computing 10 columns of the Leontief inverse matrix, which is only around 0.0001% of columns we need to compute, takes about 4 days on a powerful server with multiple CPUs, 500 GB of RAM, and 16 cores. Computing the entire Leontief inverse on a server powered with 4 GPUs takes about 1 hour.

Third, we use the properties of sparse matrices to define matrix multiplications that ignore large contiguous sub-matrices full of zeros, which is a typical feature of input-output matrices.

Fourth, we developed a custom matrix multiplication function to overcome the limitation of the relatively small memory size of GPUs. The custom matrix multiplication function splits the matrix into sub-matrices of full columns (typically in the order of a few 1000's of columns), it multiplies the sparse input-output matrix by each sub-matrix, and it concatenates all result chunks to formulate the final result.

³⁹https://tutorial.dask.org/00_overview.html